



The Time of Our Lives

A Critical History of Temporality

David Couzens Hoy

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Contents

Preface vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction xi

1 In Search of Lost Time: Kant and Heidegger 1

Kant on the Source of Time 2
Heidegger's Reading of Kant 12
The Early Heidegger 21
Reflections 35

2 There Is No Time Like the Present! On the Now 41

Hegel's Critique of the Now 42
William James and the Specious Present 44
Husserl on Time-Consciousness 48
Heidegger in *Being and Time* 55
Merleau-Ponty on Temporal Idealism 66
Derrida's Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence 76
Nietzsche and Deleuze on Eternal Recurrence 81
Reflections 89

3 Where Does the Time Go? On the Past 95

Phenomenology of the Past 96
Memory and Memorialization 101
Twentieth-Century German Phenomenology 102
Twentieth-Century French Philosophy 109
Reflections 136

4	"The Times They Are a-Changin' ": On the Future	141
	Kant and Hegel on Universal History	143
	Heidegger on the Futural	147
	Walter Benjamin's <i>Angelus Novus</i>	152
	Deleuze on the Temporality of the Self	158
	Derrida on Democracy-to-Come	163
	Žižek on Bartleby Politics	172
	Reflections	179
5	<i>Le temps retrouvé</i>: Time Reconciled	183
	Strategy 1 Remembering: Proust and Benjamin	189
	Strategy 2 Interpretation: Heidegger and Hermeneutics	196
	Strategy 3 Critique: Foucault, Derrida, and Žižek	203
	Strategy 4 Dual Temporalization: Deleuze on Aion and Chronos	214
	Closing Time	219
	Postscript on Method: Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory	223
	Genealogy and Critical Theory	228
	Universalism	233
	Genealogy and Phenomenology, Redux	236
	Notes	243
	Bibliography	267
	Index	277

Preface

This book is the first volume in a planned two-volume study of the history of consciousness. This volume represents a history of time-consciousness. The next volume, currently in progress, focuses on the history of self-consciousness. This order is itself a philosophical problem and it involves some crucial philosophical decisions. Some philosophers would expect the study of self-consciousness to come before the study of time-consciousness. These philosophers have intuitions formed by the Kantian and neo-Kantian tradition. According to this tradition, time is a form of intuition and is imposed by the mind on experience. Holders of this view might well expect, then, a theory of self-consciousness to come before (both logically and temporally) a theory of time-consciousness.

By starting with time-consciousness, this book challenges the logical ordering that puts mind before time. The thought that is being explored in the phenomenological tradition is that temporality is a condition for the possibility of subjectivity. The assumption that the reverse is the case must therefore not be taken for granted. Along the way, however, several other aspects of the Kantian tradition are also called into question. Among them is the very idea of something “coming before” something else. The transcendental program of showing the logically prior “conditions for the possibility of experience in general” is challenged here. Simply reversing

the ordering of the relation of mind and time would not break with transcendental philosophy. To make that break, a thoroughly pragmatic or hermeneutical philosophy will have to give up the project of explaining which is the more primordial, mind or time, and which is derived. Furthermore, the very concepts, *mind* and *time*, must be problematized. Although they are not necessarily abandoned, the extent to which they surreptitiously carry with them much philosophical baggage should become clearer as this historical study of time- and self-consciousness unfolds. In this volume, the idea of time-consciousness itself is called into question right at the beginning. Whether it survives at the end or not, it undergoes conceptual transformations that might well make it unrecognizable to its most famous proponent, Edmund Husserl.

A subsidiary thesis of this book is that the history of philosophy can make a philosophical difference. The method of *critical history*, or *genealogy*, is intended to challenge predominant understandings of what the philosophical issues are supposed to be by shaking the foundations of philosophy and showing that philosophical concepts and issues are not fixed in stone forever. The thought that there are perennial problems of philosophy that have not changed is thus itself to be questioned. What philosophy itself is concerned with and how it has changed needs to be shown by a critical history of philosophical themes. This history has the potential to reveal and perhaps even to cause meaning changes, conceptual shifts, and even tectonic transformations in the overall philosophical landscape. If these studies contribute to those transformations even to a small extent, they will have served their purpose.

Acknowledgments

This first volume has been a long time in gestation, and its provenance is indebted to many people. First and foremost, I should acknowledge the metaphilosophical influence of my close friend, Richard Rorty, the time of whose life sadly came to an end on June 8, 2007, the day that this manuscript was completed in Paris. If I believed in a permanent philosophical pantheon, I would certainly argue for his preeminence in it. Although he did not thematize temporality, the ideas in this book would not have been possible without our many conversations.

Next I wish to acknowledge in-depth conversations with Burkhard Kümmerer, professor of mathematics and physics in Darmstadt, Germany. Although we have known each other since 1968, in the last decade he has helped me to understand much about the time of physics, even if this book is not about physical time as such. A gifted teacher, he made many things clear to me in ways that prevented major errors I might otherwise have made. Of course, errors that I do make are entirely on my own conscience. In any case, I hereby dedicate this book to the entire Kümmerer family—Ursula, Dorothea, Burkhard, Andrea, Matthias, Henrike, and Frieder—and in particular, to the memory of Dr. Emil Kümmerer.

I should also express my gratitude to the neuroscience faculty and staff of Stanford University, including Dr. Helen Brontë-

Stewart, Dr. Jaimie Henderson, Dr. Gary Heit, Wendy Cole, Kay McGuire, and all the members of their teams. Their combined efforts have added greatly to the quality not only of my life, but the lives of many others as well. Without their expertise, as well as that of Dr. Cathleen Miller and Dr. Josh Novic, there are three of my recent books that could not have been written: one in the past (*Critical Resistance*), the present one on the history of time-consciousness, and the history of self-consciousness that should appear in the near future.

My graduate students and academic colleagues in the departments of philosophy, history of consciousness, politics, anthropology, and literature at the University of California, Santa Cruz, have been a continual source of stimulation. Research on this project has been supported by funds that came with my appointments as Presidential Chair in Philosophy as well as Distinguished Professor of Humanities. Additional funding came through the Santa Cruz Institute for Humanities Research and the Committee on Research. MIT Press editor Tom Stone as well as his helpful readers were also crucially involved in the final transformations of the manuscript into the book.

Most of all, I acknowledge Jocelyn and Meredith, for they are the ones who have made and who continue to make the time of my own life both meaningful and beautiful.

Introduction

In contrast to the exquisite inquiries of Marcel Proust into how time is experienced, philosophical attempts to describe lived temporality may appear graceless. Nevertheless, there is an appealing aesthetic quality and even a certain beauty in the subtleties, distinctions, and intricacies of the great philosophers as they work on an intractable problem such as time. Proust's goal is not so different from philosophers such as Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bergson, and Deleuze, who want to identify the source of time. Starting from the recognition of the increasingly rapid loss of time, the task becomes to explain what it is that we lose as time goes by. From these explanations comes a hope to recover or regain, not the time we have lost, but the time that remains: the time of our lives.

The project of all philosophy may be to gain reconciliation with time, whether or not a particular philosopher includes an explicit analysis of time. Not every philosopher has made time an express topic, however, and this study engages only a further subset of those who did. In particular, this study focuses on the tradition of phenomenology with attention as well to some precursors and successors. The purpose is to see how phenomenological philosophers have tried to locate the source of time, how they analyze time's passing, and finally, again like Proust, how they depict our relation to time once it has been regained. Resentment of mortality and

reconciliation with finitude are equally possible reactions to time's passing. The question becomes the normative one of how best to relate to time. There is also the political question of the optimal strategy for dealing with time's passing on the level of the social and historical. Nostalgia for the past and hope for the future each have their adherents, for instance. Yet there are those who reject both of these attitudes. If we give up utopian hopes, however, are we then simply resigned to the temporal finitude that eats away at our lives? Or in the manner of Proust or Nietzsche, can we become reconciled to time by creating our lives all over again and turning life into literature?

These questions should indicate that this book is not primarily about the nature of time in general. The focus is instead on the history of the phenomenology of time as time shows up in human lives. To write about the nature of time in and of itself would require an exploration of a complex array of issues about the status of what could be called "scientific" or "objective" or "universal" time, that is to say, the "time of the universe." Restricting the book to the phenomenology of human temporality—to "the time of our lives"—raises an equally formidable but different set of questions. In this book some of the questions raised by our authors are the following. Is the time of our lives a function of a life as a whole, a lifetime, or can it be condensed into a single moment of vision? Does a life have a unity that runs through it, or is the unity of time, and of a life, a narrative, a story, a fiction, or even an illusion? Can time be perceived? What is the time like that we encounter in our experience of our world and ourselves? Is the time of our lives the same as the time of nature or of history? In particular, if time runs through our lives, in which direction does it run? Does time come toward us from the future, as Martin Heidegger maintained, from behind us through the past, as Pierre Bourdieu asserted, or from the present, cycling perhaps in an eternal recurrence, as Friedrich Nietzsche speculated? Then there is Immanuel Kant's question: is temporality a feature of us or of

the world? That is, is the time of our lives subjective or objective, or is there a third possibility?

Such questions could well require much more than one lifetime to answer. When they are approached from the human or phenomenological viewpoint rather than from the standpoint of physics or metaphysics, however, the questions take on a different and more accessible character. To pick up on the last one as an example, a major issue is whether the time of our lives is in fact merely a subjective or perceptual phenomenon, or whether it is just as real as the time of the universe. One might think that making that distinction into a sharp difference in kind solves the problems by differentiating between, say, the way psychology might deal with time and the way physics postulates time. On this approach, physical time will be taken as real and psychological time will be construed as unreal, as a merely subjective illusion. For phenomenology, however, the very distinction between the subjective and the objective, between the physical and the psychological, is what is at issue.

To avoid ambiguous references to “time,” where whether one is talking about universal time or human time is unclear, let me stipulate provisionally a conceptual distinction between the terms “time” and “temporality.” The term “time” can be used to refer to universal time, clock time, or objective time. In contrast, “temporality” is time insofar as it manifests itself in human existence. Note that I have cautiously not specified temporality as “subjective time,” or “experienced time,” because these terms are at issue. Instead, my intention is to discuss philosophical accounts of what has been called “lived time,” or “human temporality”—hence, “the time of our lives.” Because our philosophers often do not make this distinction between the time of the universe and the time of our lives, it will be hard to maintain in every instance. We may have to ask on occasion, what “time” is it? Nevertheless, the distinction will be useful for demarcating and delimiting the issues of this study.

In the history of phenomenology, not attending to this distinction has led to some philosophical labyrinths. For instance, the first

self-described phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), was never able to complete to his own satisfaction his book, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (best translated as *On the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*). Right away, note the ambiguity that is caused by this term “internal.” Is it time or consciousness that is “internal”? The term “internal” represents a philosophical fixation on the Kantian question of whether time is real, or whether it is imposed by the mind on the world. The terms “internal” and “consciousness” also suggest that time is a thing or a quality imposed by a “subject” on “experience.” All these terms are problematic and should be used with care.

The initial task of this book will be to explain how the “time of our lives” emerges as a separate problem from the “time of the universe.” This book is intended as an introduction that explains how the problems shift when viewed from the distinctive point of view of temporality as a problem for our lives. If this book is an introduction, it is not necessarily introductory. The issues are complex and the existential perspective emerges only gradually from a historical discussion where philosophers had other goals as well. Some were trying to say what time really was, or whether it was real at all. That is not the problem here, because temporality must be *experienced* as real. Others were trying to describe temporality from a subjective as opposed to the objective point of view. That enterprise comes closer to the project here, but it is not exactly the same because for other philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the subject–object distinction is what is in question. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty want to explain that distinction as an *emergent* one that grows out of primordial temporality and that therefore cannot be used to determine the status of temporality beforehand.

As the book progresses and the phenomenological issues get sorted out, the questions become more explicitly social and political or “critical.” They also become more personal or “existential.” So as the history of the concept of temporality is reviewed, the

standpoint of this book will also emerge. In Ludwig Wittgenstein's words, "Light dawns gradually over the whole."¹ In plainer language, the book will discuss the history of the phenomenological concept of time-consciousness to the extent that it relates to wider human interests and purposes involved in questions about temporality, or the passing of time.²

Temporality

To survey the landscape of the book in more detail, I will now explain the concept of temporality in a preliminary fashion, as well as the method of analysis. For Kant, as chapter 1 shows, the main question about time is whether the time of what he calls "the starry skies above" is objective or subjective, that is, mind independent or mind dependent, real or ideal. The same question could not be asked about what I am calling temporality. Clearly human experience is temporal, whether or not we are conscious of the temporal. Also, it seems hard to deny that we can be conscious of the temporality of existence. We know, then, that temporality is real. The question of the source of time, that is, of whether time comes from the mind or the world, is obviated by the undeniable occurrence of temporality. The reality of temporality seems equally objective and subjective. Standard parlance would say that we recognize that the experience of the flow going faster or slower is subjective, yet nevertheless it is generally acknowledged that the flow is objectively happening. So the character of temporality—for example, whether it goes by quickly or slowly—appears to be dependent on the mind and would thus be said to be subjective. It is hard to deny that time goes by, however, and thus it seems incontestable that we are experiencing a phenomenon that is genuinely objective.

Focusing on temporality allows the phenomenologist to avoid many of the metaphysical questions that arise about the reality or the ideality of time. Other philosophical issues are not so easily dispelled, however. To return to the question, for instance, about

whether time can be perceived, I note that we perceive ourselves as in time, and we perceive temporal sequence. We even perceive temporality insofar as we have the experience of time passing. Thus, we can say that time passes quickly or slowly, that a piece of music was played *allegro* or *adagio*. But do we perceive time itself? It is hard to know what there would be to perceive. The steady advance of the second hand? Punching into the atomic clock? These are temporal phenomena, but they are not time.

This account involves the famous problem known as the arrow of time, which I have already invoked as a question about objective time. When temporality is what is at stake, the question becomes more particularly, in which direction do we experience the flow of temporality? Is it experienced, for instance, as coming from the past into the present and then flowing on into the future? Or does it come out of the future into the present and then on into the past? We can even ask whether the fluvial metaphor makes any sense at all. Water flows relative to the banks of the river, but relative to what could temporality be said to flow?

A related conundrum concerns the size of the present. Is it just an infinitesimal blip between the past and the future? If this were the case, and if the past and the future do not exist, then what does exist is certainly very fleeting. If the present is not to disappear, it must be more than the minuscule gap between the moment that just was and the moment that is about to come.

The discussion has now turned to the issue of the *oneness* of temporality at any given point in time. It also leads to the issue of the *unity* of temporality *over time*, which is not the same. The notions of *oneness* and *unity* are usefully distinguished. The problem about *oneness* concerns the question of how we know that any given moment is the same for everyone. That is, how is clock time possible? We can say, "Synchronize your watches," but this presupposes public time, the source of which is supposedly *objective* time. But that term is precisely the problem. The question about *unity* arises from asking about the cohesiveness of temporality. Heidegger, for

instance, wanted to know about the temporal connection of a life between birth and death. The connectedness of our lives over time is thus a central issue in our ability to be authentic beings insofar as inauthenticity is precisely the lack of temporal unity.

Genealogy and Phenomenology

These are some questions about time that turn into questions about temporality. This book will test the value of distinguishing, at least conceptually, time and temporality. A conceptual distinction is not necessarily a distinction that can be made in experience. Kant distinguishes concepts and intuitions, for instance, but he does not claim that this distinction can be experienced. Instead, every experience must combine concepts and intuitions. Specific chapters will focus on the questions about temporality that are within the purview of phenomenology. Insofar as this book represents a history of the concept of temporality, it can be read as an introduction to the philosophical issues. At the same time, however, it must enter into debate with the phenomenologists about temporal experience. It is, therefore, a *critical* history of temporality. The term “critical” here implies a connection with the tradition of critical theory. The allegiances of this book are less with the Frankfurt School, however, than with Michel Foucault’s use of the genealogical method. In Foucault’s genealogy of ethics, for instance, he is writing not about the explicit moral rules that people espouse, but more about the underlying *ethos*, or “ethical substance” of different cultures, whether ancient or modern, Western or Eastern. Ethical substance, a term he borrows without acknowledgment from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, includes the basic *ethos* of a culture’s ethical formation. This *ethos* helps to explain why people adhere to ethical norms, and what they hope to become through their pursuit of these norms.

In a study of temporality, the corollary of the *ethos* is the sense of time passing and the strategies that emerge for dealing with it.

This book therefore supplements the history of phenomenology in chapters 1 through 4 with a genealogical account of the relevance of this history for contemporary life in chapter 5. As the historical account of the phenomenology of the present, the past, and the future progresses, the normative issues about temporality will begin to appear, until finally in chapter 5, the question of how to reconcile ourselves to the passing of our lives is addressed directly.

In sum, this book is a selective study of the history of modern continental philosophy with particular attention to accounts of the temporality of the present, past, and future. The book differs from others in that it devotes a chapter to each of these three modes of time, and discusses the phenomenological philosophers who had the most to say about each modality. Insofar as it is difficult to keep the temporal dimensions entirely separate, it will be necessary to refer to the other two dimensions in discussing one. I emphasize the philosophers who have the most to say about the thematic problems associated with the particular mode of temporality over those who have less to say about it.

As that organization has disadvantages for a reader who is more interested in a particular thinker than in the separate modes of present, past, and future, I wish to point out that the book can be read either horizontally or vertically. By that I mean that if a reader were particularly interested in Heidegger or in poststructuralist philosophers such as Derrida or Deleuze, it would be possible to read the sections in different chapters bearing on that philosopher.³

In contrast to that horizontal way of working through the chapters, is the standard, vertical way of reading each chapter at a time, with its topical focus on problems arising from a particular dimension of temporality. What follows is a brief indication of the philosophical issues discussed in each chapter.

Chapter 1 sets up the issue about the source of time through an account of Kant's interpretation of time and Heidegger's deliberate

misreading of Kant. One important point that emerges from this comparison is that there is a significant difference between the Kantian approach to temporality through “faculty psychology,” and the phenomenological approach through “duration.” Although I read Husserl as a theorist of duration, I find elements of both duration and faculty psychology in his student Martin Heidegger. Issues about normativity come up with the question of whether Heidegger’s distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic is a moral distinction. Heidegger denies that the authentic–inauthentic distinction is value-laden, but I maintain that it has to be understood at least as the source of values, that is, as the basis of normativity. Other issues include a discussion of whether the mind is the source of temporality or, if that thought is not surprising enough, whether temporality could be the source of subjectivity. Questions in the philosophy of mind come up in discussing the tensions between Kant’s and Heidegger’s notions of subjectivity. Furthermore, attention has to be given to how to account for the synchronic oneness of temporality at any given moment as well as the diachronic unity of temporality over time. Chapter 1 is intended for readers with particular interests in Kant and Heidegger. The general reader may wish to start instead with chapter 2, perhaps coming back to chapter 1 later.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus respectively on each of the dimensions of present, past, and future. Chapter 2 raises the question, what is the present? The discussion starts with Hegel and William James before turning to the phenomenologists proper, namely, Husserl, the early Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Hegel and James bring out problems in specifying exactly what “now” means. Hegel raises the question of whether the word “now” works as an indexical or a universal. James sees the present as ambiguous between instantaneity and duration. Husserl’s theory of internal time-consciousness suggests how it can be both. Because Merleau-Ponty is an influential interpreter of Husserl, the order of exposition puts Merleau-Ponty before Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty sees the source

of the present in each individual, and despite his account of intersubjectivity, the problem is whether he can escape the quagmire of temporal idealism. Heidegger distinguishes various kinds of temporality, with different evaluations of the significance of the present. The question also becomes whether the emphasis on the temporal present makes Merleau-Ponty's view susceptible to Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence. Derrida's famous critique of presence is both derived from and applied to Heidegger. Another source for it is Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return, which is examined to see whether it can validate the primacy of the present. Along the way, the chapter also explores the limitations of two common metaphors for time—time as a river and time as a string of pearls—when these are applied not to time, but instead only to temporality. Merleau-Ponty's images of the fountain and the railroad car are explored as alternative metaphors for temporality.

The chapter on the past, chapter 3, is concerned with issues about where time goes and whether the past can be changed. Brief lessons are extracted from the German tradition, including Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer, as well as the French tradition, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault. Then the discussion turns to Henri Bergson, as interpreted first by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and then by Gilles Deleuze. Despite Bergson's problematic encounter with Einstein and relativity theory, Bergson's account of duration as an expandable cone is significantly different in philosophically interesting ways from Husserl's graph, which still represents temporality as linear and punctual.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the future, raising issues about the phenomenology of the futural, but also about political implications. In particular, the question is whether we need to hope for future utopias in order to justify present actions. Action requires a sense of direction, which has been imperiled by the speed of modern life and the need to act without reflection. The models for a historical sense of hope are Kant and Hegel, who are then contrasted with philosophers who do not share the hopes of the Enlightenment. In

contrast to Marx's hope for Revolution as a response to temporality, I consider Žižek's attitude of Refusal, in the manner of Bartleby, as well as Derrida's "roguish" political program of deconstructive genealogy. The genealogical dimension of this study starts to become evident in this chapter, and it appears explicitly with the normative issues raised in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 thus concludes with some existential strategies for dealing with the apparent flow of temporality. Proust and Benjamin are contrasted on the effectiveness of reminiscence and remembrance for ameliorating the sting of time's passing. In addition to a discussion of Heidegger's political attitudes and the changes in his thought, this chapter takes seriously Slavoj Žižek's critique of both Heidegger and poststructuralism. Finally, it concludes with a reading of Deleuze that links without synthesizing Husserl's and Bergson's approaches to temporality. A postscript on the genealogical method in contrast to phenomenology and critical theory clarifies the philosophical allegiances of this study of the time of our lives.

1 In Search of Lost Time: Kant and Heidegger

Where should a history of the phenomenology of temporality begin? Strictly speaking, phenomenology in the distinctive sense that it has today starts with Edmund Husserl. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are then among those who subsequently self-identified as phenomenologists, although Heidegger's connection to Husserl makes that label problematic. Any such history would have to recognize, however, that phenomenology emerges from a longer and wider tradition that includes major figures such as Immanuel Kant as well as Husserl's precursors and near contemporaries such as William James or Franz Brentano.

This chapter begins accordingly with an introductory account of Kant in the first section, followed by a discussion of Heidegger's reading of Kant in the second section, and of the development of the early Heidegger's own efforts at explaining temporality in the third section. In the broadest terms, the principal thread is the search for the source of temporality. Although vastly different in style from Proust's project of searching for lost time, the philosophical search for the source of time is similar in its goals. Proust's project is informed, after all, by Bergson's theory of temporality, as we will see in later chapters. The question raised by both literature and philosophy concerns time's passing, and how to reconcile ourselves to it. The philosophical project is to construct a theory

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