


NIETZSCHE



by Martin Heidegger

Volumes One and Two

Translated by David Farrell Krell



Nietzsche

VOLUMES I AND II

The Will to Power as Art

The Eternal Recurrence of the Same

HarperCollins Editions of
MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Basic Writings

Being and Time

Discourse on Thinking

Early Greek Thinking

The End of Philosophy

Hegel's Concept of Experience

Identity and Difference

Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will to Power as Art

Nietzsche: Volume II, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same

Nietzsche: Volume III, The Will to Power as Knowledge

and as Metaphysics

Nietzsche: Volume IV, Nihilism

On the Way to Language

On Time and Being

Poetry, Language, Thought

The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays

What Is Called Thinking?

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Nietzsche

Volume I: The Will to Power as Art

Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same

Translated from the German by

DAVID FARRELL KRELL



HarperSanFrancisco

A Division of HarperCollins Publishers

Volume One of Martin Heidegger's text was originally published in *Nietzsche, Erster Band*, © Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen, 1961.

Nietzsche, Volume I: The Will to Power as Art, Copyright © 1979 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. Appendix and Analysis copyright © 1979 by David Farrell Krell. Introduction to the Paperback edition, copyright © 1991 by David Farrell Krell.

Volume Two was originally published in *Nietzsche, Erster Band*, © Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen, 1961, and in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, copyright © 1954 by Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen.

Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, Copyright © 1986 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. Analysis copyright © 1986 by David Farrell Krell.

All rights reserved. For sale in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced or stored in a retrieval system without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address HarperCollins Publishers, 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.

First Heideggerian Paperback Version Translated in 1991

Designed by Jim Merrick

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.

[Nietzsche. English]

Nietzsche / Martin Heidegger ; edited by David Farrell Krell. — 1st

HarperCollins pbk. ed.

p. cm.

Translation of: Nietzsche.

Reprint. Originally published: San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1979-1981.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents: v. 1-2. The will to power as art : the eternal recurrence of the same — v. 3-6. The will to power as knowledge, and as metaphysics ; nihilism.

ISBN 0-06-063611-9 (v. 1-2). — ISBN 0-06-063744-3 (v. 3-6)

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. I. Krell, David Farrell

II. Title

B3279.H48N3413 — 1991

193—476

91-49074

CIP

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Nietzsche

Volume I:
The Will to Power as Art

Translated from the German, with Notes and an Analysis, by

DAVID FARRELL KRELL

With a Facsimile Page from the Original Manuscript

Contents

Introduction to the Paperback Edition	ix
Editor's Preface	xxix
Plan of the English Edition	xxxv
Author's Foreword to All Volumes	xxxix

THE WILL TO POWER AS ART	1
1. Nietzsche as Metaphysical Thinker	3
2. The Book, <i>The Will to Power</i>	7
3. Plans and Preliminary Drafts of the "Main Structure"	12
4. The Unity of Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence, and Revaluation	15
5. The Structure of the "Major Work." Nietzsche's Manner of Thinking as Reversal	25
6. The Being of beings as Will in Traditional Metaphysics	31
7. Will as Will to Power	37
8. Will as Affect, Passion, and Feeling	44
9. The Idealistic Interpretation of Nietzsche's Doctrine of Will	54
10. Will and Power. The Essence of Power	59
11. The Grounding Question and the Guiding Question of Philosophy	67
12. Five Statements on Art	69
13. Six Basic Developments in the History of Aesthetics	77
14. Rapture as Aesthetic State	92
15. Kant's Doctrine of the Beautiful. Its Misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche	107
16. Rapture as Force engendering Force	115

17. The Grand Style	124
18. Grounding the Five Statements on Art	135
19. The Raging Discordance between Truth and Art	142
20. Truth in Platonism and Positivism: Nietzsche's Attempt to Overturn Platonism on the Basis of the Fundamental Experience of Nihilism	151
21. The Scope and Context of Plato's Meditation on the Relationship of Art and Truth	162
22. Plato's <i>Republic</i> : The Distance of Art (<i>Mimesis</i>) from Truth (<i>Idea</i>)	171
23. Plato's <i>Phaedrus</i> : Beauty and Truth in Felicitous Discordance	188
24. Nietzsche's Overturning of Platonism	200
25. The New Interpretation of Sensuousness and the Raging Discordance between Art and Truth	211
Appendix: A manuscript page from the lecture course <i>Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst</i> [Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art], Winter Semester 1936–37	
Analysis by David Farrell Krell	224
Glossary	230
	258

Volume II begins following page 263.

Introduction to the Paperback Edition

Heidegger Nietzsche Nazism

By David Farrell Krell

Take the thinker of the "blood feast." And another who is a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party. The result does ill for the matter of *thinking* that is Heidegger's Nietzsche. Even after Walter Kaufmann's labors to defend Nietzsche against the charge of being the prototypical ideologue of National Socialism—a charge brought by virtually all the Postwar literature on nazism and fascism—Nietzsche's virulence continues to eat away at today's reader. And now the "second wave" of the "Heidegger scandal" (the first came immediately after World War II, carried out in part in *Les temps modernes*) leaves in its wake the conviction that Heidegger the man and the thinker was embroiled in National Socialism to a far greater extent than we hitherto believed. Nevertheless, Heidegger himself insisted that it was precisely in his Nietzsche, in these volumes the reader now has in hand, that his resistance to National Socialism can most readily be seen. In the *Spiegel* interview of 1966, first published after his death on May 26, 1976, Heidegger asserts: "Everyone who had ears to hear was able to hear in these lectures [that is, the series of lectures on Nietzsche given from 1936 to 1940] a confrontation with National Socialism."¹

¹"Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten (Only a God Can Save Us Now)," *Der Spiegel*, vol. 33, no. 23 (May 31, 1976), p. 204; trans. by Maria P. Aker and John C. Caputo in *Philosophy Today*, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1976), p. 274.

Let us set aside the “Nietzsche case” for the moment, and, without attempting a thorough evaluation of Heidegger’s claims concerning his Nietzsche as resistance, try to gain some perspective on two questions. First, what was the nature of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism? Second, what does Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* tell us about that engagement?

HEIDEGGER’S INVOLVEMENT

The only detailed and reliable accounts of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism are those by the Freiburg historians Hugo Ott and Bernd Martin.² Their research indicates that Heidegger’s engagement in the university politics of National Socialism was far more intense, and his statements on his own behalf after the War far more unreliable and self-serving, than anyone has suspected. His role as Party member and rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933–1934 was not merely that of a reluctant fellow traveler caught up in a fleeting episode of political enthusiasm. Heidegger was not a dupe, not a victim of his own political naivete. The problem is not that Heidegger lacked a political theory and a political praxis but that at least for a time he had them. He devoted his rectorship to devising and carrying out plans for the full synchronization or consolidation (*Gleichschaltung*)

²Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Entwürfe zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt and New York: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), esp. pp. 131–219; and Bernd Martin, ed., *Heidegger: Martin Heidegger, Heft 9a: “Martin Heidegger: Ein Philosoph und die Politik”* (June 1966), esp. pp. 32–52, now reprinted in Bernd Martin, ed., *Martin Heidegger: Einführung in das dritte Reich* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchverlag, 1989). Among the philosophical responses, see the excellent introduction by Roger Beaumont in *Bulletin of the German Studies Society*, London, vol. 12, no. 1 (1990). For an extended, thought-provoking response, see Jacques Derrida, *De l’Épave: Heidegger et la question* (Paris: Galilée, 1987), translated as *Of Spine: Heidegger and the Question*, by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); see also my “Spining Heidegger,” in *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. XVIII (1988), 205–30, for a brief discussion of Derrida’s demanding text. Finally, see Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 2nd ed. (Fribingen: Neske, 1987), pp. 319–22; translated as *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, by Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Beber (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1987).

tung) of the German university with the Third Reich. To this end he worked closely with the National-Socialist culture ministers in Karlsruhe and Berlin, that is to say, at both the state and national levels. His active support and leadership of the "reformed" (that is, Party-dominated) student government, his proselytizing on behalf of Hitler and National Socialism in those crucial early years, and, above all, his plan to cripple the university senate and to arrogate to himself as rector full administrative power, to serve as the *Führer-Rektor* of the university and as the spiritual-intellectual guide of the Party as a whole, are the most damning consequences of that involvement.¹ Even more sinister are his denunciations of university students and colleagues who were recalcitrant to the "Movement," or who could be made to seem so.² Finally, Heidegger's efforts in his own defense after the War are, to say the least, less than candid. Both his statement to the denazification committee in 1945 and the *Spiegel* interview of 1966 distort the record on several important matters, including Heidegger's nomination to and resignation from the rectorship.³

Yet what Heidegger said after the War pales in comparison with what he left unsaid. Whether for reasons of shame or feelings of helplessness and hopelessness; whether in proud refusal of public apology or in avoidance of the almost universal sycophancy of those days, during which countless ex-nazis claimed to have seen, heard, said, done, and been nothing, nowhere, at no time whatsoever; or whether simply out of an incapacity to face the brutal facts, facts beyond wickedness and imagination—whatever the reasons, Heidegger never uttered a

¹See Kreß, "Heidegger's Rectification of the German University," in Richard Band, ed., *Our Academic Contract: "Mischke's" in America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1990), forthcoming.

²See Heidegger on the Baumgarten and Staudinger cases, pp. 153–55, 201–03, 252–55, and 315–17.

³See Uel, *Erwegung*, but esp. pp. 100–02 and 224–25. See also Franz Wenzel's review in the *Radiische Zeitung* for May 5, 1955 (no. 103), 1.9 of Heidegger's edition of the rectorial address and the 1955 statement, *Martin Heidegger: Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität: Das Rektorat, 1933/34, Tatsachen und Gedanken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1957). Karsten Harries has translated both documents in *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 38, no. 3 (March 1955), 307–20.

public work on the extermination of the Jews in the death camps of the Third Reich. While always ready to commiserate with the German soldiers and refugees in eastern Europe, and while always prepared to bemoan the plight of a divided Postwar Germany, Heidegger consigned the horrors of the Holocaust to total silence. A silence intensified by his acknowledgment of the sufferings of his countrymen and his fatherland, a silence framed and set off by what he did lament. A silence, in short, that betrays and belittles the matter of his thinking, which he claimed to be his sole concern.

For certain issues in his thinking cry for an end to the silence. His meditations on the technological reduction of human beings to mere stockpiles, on the upsurge of evil and malignancy in the wake of the departed gods, and on the limitations of contemporary ethical and political thinking remain fundamentally incomplete if they fail to confront the Extermination. The death camps cry for painstaking thinking and writing, though not overhasty speech. And Heidegger's silence is more deafening than all the noise of his rectorship.

HEIDEGGER'S NIETZSCHE

Precisely because of that silence, the works of Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, first published in 1961, are richly in contact. They reveal a thinker who is repelled by the racism and biologism of his Party, yet one whose nationalism almost always gets the better of him. It is not yet a chauvinism, not yet a xenophobia, but a nationalism that conforms to the nation of thinkers and poets, a nationalism of the German academic aristocracy of which Heidegger yearned to be a part. Nationalism and a certain militancy and even militarism, or at least an admiration of things military, of World War I heroes, of striving and struggle, reticence and resoluteness, "the hard and the heavy."

Let me now, by way of introduction, indicate some of those places in the four volumes reprinted in this two-volume paperback edition of *Nietzsche* where Heidegger's involvement in or resistance to National Socialism comes to the fore. It seems to me that there are four recurrent themes in these volumes that are particularly relevant to the question of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and National Socialism: Heideg-

ger's nationalism, his call for decision, what we might call his *decisionism*, his protracted and difficult discussion of nihilism, and his ambivalent position vis-à-vis Nietzsche's alleged biologism.

1. **Nationalism.** Heidegger's nationalism is not of the flag-waving variety. It is a nationalism of high cultural expectations and intellectual demands, shaped by Hölderlin's and Nietzsche's challenges to the German people. In Heidegger's view, the matter of thinking as such has to do principally with ancient Greece and contemporary Germany, along something like an Athens-Urteiburg Axis. Hölderlin's and Nietzsche's responses to early Greek thinking and poetry compel nothing less than a historic decision that the German people must confront. There are moments when a crasser form of nationalism obtrudes, as when Heidegger refers to the British destruction of the French fleet at Oran, Algeria, on July 3, 1940 (IV, 144–45); or a more critical form, as when he decries the situation of scientific research in the mobilized and subservient German university that he helped to create (II, 102–4). However, the issue of nationalism is usually far more subtle, as when Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche by suggesting that his primary motivation in metaphysical matters was Latin, Roman, or Italianate, rather than pristinely Greek (IV, 165). Every bit as subtle, yet far more worrying, is Heidegger's suppression of Nietzsche's acerbic anti-Germanism and his positive pan-Europeanism. The latter does emerge occasionally in Heidegger's account, as in the passage we are about to cite, but Heidegger's more persistent attitude is betrayed in a note jotted down in 1959: he calls Nietzsche *unfeuersch*—taking that to be a criticism! More troubling still is the pervasive tendency of his lectures and essays to take nihilism and the collapse of values as a matter of the *Vol*k, a matter that calls for hulk deeds and interminable struggle:

There is no longer any goal in and through which all the forces of the historical existence of peoples can cohere and in the direction of which they can develop, no goal of such a kind, which means at the same time and above all else no goal of such power that it can by virtue of its power conduct Dasein to its realm in a unified way and bring it to creative evolution. . . . To ground the goal means to awaken and liberate those powers

which lend the newly established goal its surpassing and pervasive energy to inspire commitment. . . . Here, finally, and that means primarily, belongs the growth of forces . . . which induce it to undertake bold deeds (I, 157–58)

Heidegger emphasizes that such bold deeds cannot be the property of "individual groups, classes, and sects," nor even "individual states and nations," that such deeds must be "European at least." Yet European is to be taken, not "internationally," but nationally, as though someone were dreaming of reducing all Europe to a single national or imperial power:

That does not mean to say that it should be "international," nor implied in the essence of a creative establishment of goals . . . is that it comes to exist and swings into action, as historical, only in the unity of the truly historical Dasein of men in the form of particular nations. That means neither isolation from other nations nor hegemony over them. Establishment of goals is in itself confrontation, the initiation of struggle (*Kampf*). But the genuine struggle is the one in which those who struggle excel, first the one then the other, and in which the power for such excelling unfolds within them. (I, 158)

Nietzsche's "grand politics," according to Heidegger, rejects the "exclusionary power politics of imperialism." Yet Heidegger's own grand politics retains sufficient emphasis on struggle and boldness to trouble us: the *agon* between historical peoples, who for reasons Heidegger neglects to provide can swing into action only as nations, will allow no alternation of excellence.

2. Decisionism. Heidegger's view of the will and willing is far from straightforward, and it appears to undergo development during the years 1936–1940. That view becomes far more critical, betraying a waxing anxiety in the face of will and power. Yet the call for decision, *Entscheidung*, is a constant in Heidegger's writings of the 1930s and 1940s. If his is not a voluntarism of the usual sort, it is decidedly a decisionism.

We find examples in all four volumes. In the first lecture course,

"The Will to Power as Act," decision derives from a transcendent will to power and is equated with self-assertion. *Selbstbehauptung*, Heidegger declares that "self-assertion is original assertion of essence" (I, 61). The word and entire rhetoric of self-assertion are reminiscent of Heidegger's inaugural address as rector of Freiburg University in 1933, "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in which the language of academic freedom evokes Heidegger's own plans for secularization. Yet decisions need not always be a matter of overt political or institutional action. "Decision has to do preeminently with thinking: "... in a time of decline, a time when all's coming-feit and pointless activity, thinking in the grand style is genuine action, indeed, action in its most powerful — thought must *act*—form" (II, 10–11). Thus decision straddles the threshold of the Nietzschean gateway called "Moment" or "Flash of an Eye," *Augenblick*. All depends on whether one operates from the sidelines or stands in the gateway of the two eternities, which is the gateway of time: "That which is to come is precisely a matter for decision, since the ring is not closed in some remote infinity but possesses its unbroken closure in the Moment, as the center of the striving; what occurs—if it is to occur—is decided by the Moment..." (II, 57). Crucial in Heidegger's view is whether or not the thought of return convinces us that decision is useless, always already too late, so that it "deprives us of the ballast and steadying weight of decision and action" (II, 132). Thus the entire eighteenth section of the second lecture course, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," takes up "the thought of return — and freedom."

Heidegger argues that eternal recurrence is neither a scientific hypothesis to be tested nor a religious belief to be professed and propounded. Rather, it is a possibility of thought and decision. The latter, *Entscheidung*, involves "an authentic appropriation of the self" but also implies "the preparative event [*Freignis*] for historical marking as a whole." Decision is therefore a bridge between Heidegger's thinking of the ecstatic-temporality of *Dasein* and the historical immoding of being as such, a bridge, in other words, connecting Heidegger's project of a fundamental ontology of human existence with his later

preoccupation with the truth and history of being as such. We should therefore pause a moment in order to examine those "supreme and ultimate decisions" (II, 133) that Heidegger sees as the proper horizon of eternal recurrence. For just as the supreme and ultimate decision to condemn Heidegger as a nazi is suspect, so is Heidegger's own passion for apocalyptic decision suspect, decision as "the proper truth of the thought" (II, 133). It cannot be a matter of our reaffirming the sort of moral freedom that Kant is thought to have secured in his Critical project, inasmuch as Heidegger (together with Nietzsche) is confronting that project quite explicitly in these lectures (II, 134). Nor would it be a matter of hoping to find in some post-Kantian thinker—such as Schelling, for example—a justification of freedom that Heidegger might simply have "overlooked." It would rather be a matter of analyzing more carefully Heidegger's hope that we can "shape something supreme out of the next moment, as out of every moment" (II, 136); his hope, in other words, that a decisive thinking can shape something *momentous*. "It will be decided on the basis of what you will of yourself, what you are *able* to will of yourself" (II, 136).

Is it such statements as these that Heidegger will rue later in his critique of the will to will? And does even that critique go to the heart of Heidegger's own decisionism?

Perhaps the best critical tool we have at our disposal to counter such willfulness is Heidegger's and Nietzsche's discussion of the desire to "settle accounts" by means of "infinite calculation" (II, 137). Just as we mistrust the endeavor to "settle accounts" once and for all with Heidegger, Nietzsche, and nazism, so too we must suspect the decisionism that forgets the finitude of time. (Heidegger reminds us here of Aristotle's treatise on time in his *Physics* IV, chapters 10–14.) We would have to ask whether Heidegger himself forgets the finitude of time when he tells his students that "the decisive condition is you yourself, that is to say, the manner in which you achieve your self by becoming your own master . . ." (II, 135).

Self-Mastery? What if, as Pierre Klossowski argues, the thinking of eternal recurrence as the finitude of time makes precisely such self-mastery impossible? What if the thinking of eternal return is

catapulted outside and beyond every concept of self? Masters is the also-prime of oneself into the will, says Heidegger: "... by seeing to it that when you engage your will essentially you take yourself up into that will and so attain freedom" (II, 138). Can what so *is* like the most traditional of freedoms be so free? "We are free only when we been be free, and we become free only by virtue of our wills" (II, 138). Does not Heidegger's decisionism at times seem a massive solipsism? However, when it comes to decisions about matters of thought, we would be hard-pressed to find better advice than the following: "From the very section (pp. 138) we have been reading: 'Yet so much is clear: the doctrine of return should never be concerted in such a way that it fits into the readily available 'antinomy' of freedom and necessity. At the same time, this reminds us once again of our sole task — to think this most difficult thought as it demands to be thought, on its own terms, leaving aside all supports and makeshifts'" (II, 139).

That said, it remains troubling that Nietzsche's thought of eternal recurrence of the same is persistently thought in the conjunction of "a historical decision — a crisis" (II, 154). It is as though Heidegger were seeking in history and in the life of the Volk that "final, total scission" of which Schelling dreamt. Heidegger resists the "politics" to which Alfred Baeumler would bend Nietzsche's thoughts (II, 164), yet himself seeks the *diminution* of Nietzsche's thought of return in the history of nihilism — more precisely, in the countermovement of that history. He condemns the automatic association of nihilism with Bolshevism (common in the Germany of his day, as in the America of ours) as "not merely superficial thinking, but unconscionable demagoguery" (II, 175).

However, when Heidegger's and Nietzsche's own ways of thinking nihilism are condemned as probabilist and totalitarian, are the superficiality and demagoguery any less conspicuous? How are we to think in

⁵ See the references to Klossowski's *Caroleus verus* and the discussion of its "basal ontology Analysis" in vol. II, pp. 278–81; for further discussion, see chap. seven of Krell, *On Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 275–83.

a way that is serious and not simply journalistic: the problematic character of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's desire to "confront" and "forthwith overcome" the history of nihilism (II, 182).⁷ For this very desire is what we must have to ponder. The desire to overcome nihilism exhibits a craving for results in history, a craving that itself has a history, a history that is none other than the history of nihilism.⁸

3. *Nihilism*. The entire fourth volume in this series focuses on the issue of nihilism, so that there is no way I can do justice to it here. Not only that, each of the remaining volumes touches on this complex matter: will to power as art is proclaimed the counter-movement to nihilism, a nihilism Nietzsche sees at work already in Platonism (I, 151); the thought of eternal return has as its domain the historical arena where nihilism is overcome (II, 170); in short, nihilism is an essential motif of Nietzsche's metaphysics (III, 201–8); and as the fourth volume concludes throughout, *nihilism* is the name of our essential crisis, the history in which being comes to nothing.

If an introduction to all these facets of nihilism is virtually impossible, let me at least try to state in a general way Heidegger's thesis concerning nihilism, and then move on to the question of the political context of that thesis. Heidegger is concerned to show that all the trendy diagnoses and preferred therapies of nihilism are bound to fail; no, not only bound to fail, but also likely to aggravate our situation by dangling hopes of facile solutions before our eyes. For Heidegger, nihilism results from our persistent failure to *think the nothing*, to confront in our thought the power of the *nihil* in human existence, which is mortal existence, and in history, which is the history of the oblivion of being and the abandonment by being. Such thinking requires a protracted confrontation with the history of Western thought since Plato—which is what Heidegger's *Nietzsche* is all about—and unflinching meditation on human mortality and the finitude of time,

⁷See Koell, *Lectures on Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966), chap. 9, esp. pp. 138–60.

being, and propagation. If dogged thought on human mortality seems unduly pessimistic, and if thought on the history of philosophy seems onerous, Heidegger replies that our optimism always underestimates the challenge of mortal thinking and that our reluctance to take the end of history seriously reflects nothing if not the historical impact of nihilism itself.

No matter how brief my own analyses of the political "context" of nihilism in Heidegger's *Nietzsche* may be, I nevertheless want to direct readers of this new edition of *Nietzsche* to them (see III, 263–74, and IV, 262–76). The Analyses focus on two matters. First, Heidegger's indebtedness to Ernst Jünger's books, *Total Mobilization* (1930) and *The Worker* (1932). Jünger's influence on Heidegger's thought concerning planetary technology is profound. Technology constitutes the major political dilemma of our time, according to both Jünger and Heidegger, a dilemma that no known political system is capable of discerning, much less solving. Yet Heidegger resists Jünger's "ecstatic" and "numinous" celebration of technology. He resists Jünger's technophilic "symbols," spurns his language. Heidegger's opposition to Jünger's notions of will and power translates eventually into a resistance—quite strong by 1939—to Nietzsche's notion of will to power. Will to power is will-to-will, and such redoubled willing is machination. Second, in both Analyses much is said about Heidegger's contemporary, Alfred Baeumler, who became professor of philosophy in Berlin from 1933 to 1945 after Heidegger elected to "stay in the provinces." Baeumler's influential monograph, *Nietzsche the Philosopher and Politician* (1931) is important both for what Heidegger accepts from it and what he rejects. What he rejects is Baeumler's "politics."

No doubt much remains to be said about the importance for Heidegger of both Jünger and Baeumler, as of Carl Schmitt, the jurist who supported National Socialism in both theory and practice. Yet no matter how much my remarks need fleshing out, I can largely affirm today what they say. Yet I would formulate differently the "withering" of the attraction of National Socialism for Heidegger after 1934: the fact is that Heidegger's resignation from the rectorship was a symptom of his failed bid for Party leadership in the university, the

state, and the country. His withdrawal from political life and internal emigration cannot be interpreted in terms of genuine resistance as easily as we once thought. Finally, I would alter altogether my account of Heidegger's accession to the rectorship (IV, 268–69), in order to bring that account into line with current research.⁶

4. **Biologism.** For an audience that was receiving uninterrupted instruction in its racial superiority, indeed, its racial supremacy, the issue of Nietzsche's alleged biologism must have been of signal importance. Here Heidegger's resistance to Party doctrine is most visible, especially in his satiric remarks on poetry, digestion, and a healthy people in the Hölderlin lectures (IV, 260). Yet Heidegger's sarcasm does not resolve all the problems or banish all our suspicions.

His account of Nietzsche's physiology of artistic rapture (I, 126–51) suggests that Nietzsche himself overcomes both the physiological-biological and the aesthetic positions. Whether the Party's racist and biologicistic dogmas cause Heidegger to overreact to the point where he is unable or unwilling to elaborate the "new interpretation of sensuousness" is an arresting question: readers of the first lecture course would do well to keep it in mind. Although Heidegger does stress that the human body is essential to existence, inasmuch as *Dasein* is some body who is alive (Heidegger plays with the words *leben* and *leiben*, living and "bodying forth"), his reluctance to confront the biological body is everywhere in evidence. Much of the third lecture course, "The Will to Power as Knowledge," takes up the question of Nietzsche's putative biologism (III, 39–47; 70–70). To be sure, Nietzsche's thinking seems to be biologicistic, and to that extent Heidegger is rightly critical of it. Yet the accusation of biologism in fact "presents the main obstacle to our penetrating to his fundamental thought" (III, 41). For even when Nietzsche invokes "life," he does so *metaphysically*, not biologically (III, 46). Even when Nietzsche discusses the law of noncontradiction in terms of biology, the discussion remains at an ontological level (III, 103–4; 115–22). Heidegger empha-

⁶Again, see my "Destititization of the German University," esp. Part II.

sives by way of conclusion: "Nietzsche thinks the [biological] the essence of what is alive, in the direction of commanding and poetizing, of the perspectival and horizontal; in the direction of freedom" (III, 122). A conclusion that would take us back to the question of freedom—and Heidegger's decisionism.

In the 1940 lectures on "European Nihilism" (IV, 147–49), Heidegger betrays how sensitive an issue biologism is for him. Here he compares Nietzsche's metaphysics to that of Hegel: if Hegel's is a metaphysics of reason and spirit, as the culmination of Cartesian subjectivism, Nietzsche's is one of animality, yet still within that same Cartesian tradition. "The absolute essence of subjectivity necessarily develops as the *brutalitas* of *bestialitas*. At the end of metaphysics stands the statement *Homo est brutum bestiale*" (IV, 148). The end of metaphysics, one might say by way of pun or typo, is the beginning of meatphysics. Heidegger now claims that Nietzsche's *Umwelt* of the "blood beast" is "not a casual exaggeration, but the password and countersign" of Nietzsche's historical entanglements. How odd that Heidegger should cite (critically) the phrase with which this Introduction began—the phrase that delineates in a straight line, without punctuation or deviation, the triad from which Heidegger would want to extricate himself: Heidegger Nietzsche Nazism. In "Nietzsche's Metaphysics" (III, 218), Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's "nihilistic negation of reason" does not so much exclude reason as place it in the service of animality. Or, more precisely, it subjects both spirit and body to a metaphysics of the will to power as command, calculative thought, and the positing of values (III, 224). Yet even in his censure of Nietzschean overman, or perhaps of a caricature of the *Übermensch*, with the overman as a product of technological mechanization and machination, Heidegger avoids leveling the charge of biologism:

The breeding of human beings is not a taming in the sense of a suppression and hobbling of sensuality; rather, breeding is the accumulation and purification of energies in the univocity of the strictly controllable "automatism" of every activity. Only where the absolute subjectivity of will to power ceases to be the truth of beings as a whole is the principle of

a program of racial breeding possible; possible, that is, not merely on the basis of naturally evolving races, but, in terms of the self-conscious thought of race. That is to say, the principle is metaphysically necessary. Just as Nietzsche's thought of will to power was ontological rather than biological, even more was his racial thought metaphysical rather than biological in meaning. (III, 236–37)

Enough of metaphysics, then: neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger would be guilty of it. Yet is Heidegger writing here in his own voice, or is he trying, whether successfully or not, merely to report on Nietzsche's thought? No matter how we decide, and such decisions are always excruciating if not impossible to make, the thoughts expressed here give us pause. To this ontological or metaphysical elevation of the thought of race, Jacques Derrida has posed the inevitable and painful question: "When Heidegger or Nietzsche or Heidegger/Nietzsche appeals to a principle of a programmed racial breeding; when he subordinates biology to a metaphysics of will to power; when he abjures the contingency of 'naturally evolving races' and adopts instead as though suddenly ventriloquizing Hegel, speaking through the spiritual mouth of Hegelian spirit — 'the self-conscious thought of race'; when he does all these things, does he alleviate or aggravate the thought of race and racism, the *Rassengedanke*? Does metaphysics alleviate or confirm the rule of racism? 'A metaphysics of race' — is this more grave or less grave than a naturalism or a biologism of race?"⁹

By leaving the question in suspense, Derrida does not mean that we should suspend thought about it. Anything but that. The apparently academic question of "biologism" is an issue that every reader of these volumes will have to confront, finding his or her own way between Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the worst violence of the night.

HEIDEGGER'S CONTRIBUTIONS

The very issues we have been raising in an introductory fashion — nationalism, decisionism, nihilism, and biologism — are by no means

⁹ Derrida, *De l'écrit*, pp. 118–19; Eng. trans., p. 74.

inserted in the Nietzsche volumes. They might well lead us to Heidegger's second major work of the 1930s, his *Contributions to Philosophy (On Propagation)*, written between 1936 and 1938, that is to say, simultaneously with the first two parts of the Nietzsche, but published only recently.¹⁰

Here Heidegger's racism is in and of itself in no way profound or disconcerting. No matter how reasoning is solemn against "racism" and the "idiotic animality" of technologized man may be, his scorn of "liberalism" and his fears of "Bolshevism" undermine the reader's confidence (see 65, 10, 25, 28, 53-54, 163, and elsewhere). He shares that scorn and those fears with every "young conservative" intellectual of the Weimar era. No matter how revealing his mockery of the Stefan George Circle, with their adulation of Nietzsche and antiquity (63, 73), Heidegger himself equates philosophy with "the philosophy of a people," and the only two peoples he mentions are the ancient Greeks and contemporary Germans (60, 12, 319, 390, 399, 414). He shares the fascinations of the George-Kreis. No matter what justice there may be in his claim that ecclesiastical Christendom and the Third Reich both subscribe to the "totalizing worldview" (65, 40-41, 140), his desire to "grant historical mankind a goal once again" (65, 16) seems to be every bit as totalizing. And whatever "justice" there may be in such "judgments," the question of justice as the culmination of the history of truth as the correctness of propositions will have to be raised more perspicuously than Heidegger has raised it in the Nietzsche volumes (see III, 157-49 and 255-51; cf. IV, 139-46). His call for apocalyptic or at least eschatological "decision" (65, 87, 105) is as concerning in the *Contributions* as in the Nietzsche. His need to enkindle the "hearth fires" of philosophy and the nation is not exactly heart warming, his willingness to bandy about the shib-

¹⁰Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Von Ereignis)*, vol. 65 of the Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989). Throughout these Nietzsche volumes, the Gesamtausgabe volumes are cited as MFC, or simply by volume (in italics) and page (e.g., 65, 54). See my Analysis Ia vol. I, pp. 252-81, which at least could only anticipate the contents of the Beiträge. And see the chapter entitled "Contributions to I, 6" in my forthcoming book, *Daheim über Heidegger and "Lebensphilosophie."*

- [Response pdf, azw \(kindle\), epub](#)
- [click Voyagers of the Silver Sand \(Secrets of Droon, Special Edition 3\)](#)
- [click Wretched, Pitiful, Poor, Blind and Naked](#)
- [read online Quaternary Dating Methods pdf, azw \(kindle\), epub, doc, mobi](#)
- [Practical LSD Manufacture \(3rd Edition\) here](#)

- <http://aircon.servicessingaporecompany.com/?lib/Response.pdf>
- <http://studystategically.com/freebooks/Voyagers-of-the-Silver-Sand--Secrets-of-Droon--Special-Edition-3-.pdf>
- <http://nautickim.es/books/A-Foucault-Primer--Discourse--Power-and-the-Subject.pdf>
- <http://qolorea.com/library/Quaternary-Dating-Methods.pdf>
- <http://unpluggedtv.com/lib/When-Technology-Fails--A-Manual-for-Self-Reliance--Sustainability--and-Surviving-the-Long-Emergency--2nd-Edition-.p>