# Deleuze and the Social

Edited by Martin Fuglsang and Bent Meier Sørensen

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## Deleuze Connections

'It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity. What defines it is the AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering.'

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*

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# Acknowledgements

As editors, we could, of course, take responsibility for the textual obscurities that might remain throughout the book. Humility, however, prevents us from doing so. We fully expect that it is from these very zones of indiscernability that this book's most substantial lines of flight will depart. In many ways, they are the reason we wanted to make this book and, in the end, they belong to no one. They are what is to come.

Introduction

# Deleuze and the Social: Is there a D-function?

*Martin Fuglsang and Bent Meier Sørensen*

In the midst of the delirium of *Anti-Oedipus*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari calmly inform us that we 'always make love with worlds' (1984: 294). This marks their final transgression of the repressive segmentation of contemporary critique: the segmentation of the libidinal economy and the political economy, desire production and social production, Freud and Marx. In the Oedipal triangle and its double bind, desire was forever betrayed and political critique was forever kept from connecting with the real processes of production. This impasse is still with us: contemporary sociology makes love with no worlds we are aware of; social and economic analysis in general is paralysed before the problem of liberating desire, criticising its capture and expressing its abundance.

But is it feasible to put together a book that makes love with worlds? It will, in any case, put us in the volatile position of the alcoholic engaged in the experiment of drinking, always searching for the penultimate rather than the ultimate drink. The penultimate drink is a limit of relative deterritorialisation (you change, but you don't leave), whereas the threshold is the ultimate drink that will make the alcoholic change assemblage altogether, progressing into a hospital assemblage or a suicide assemblage. The penultimate drink will enable him to keep on drinking, living, moving, loving, while the ultimate drink is the end (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 438).

A book such as this should be penultimate, not only because it is in its actualisation in the life of the reader that the experiment should prove its worth, but also because 'the social' in the works of Deleuze and Guattari can only be approached as a liminal experience, that is, as the penultimate task in an infinite experiment, an event of counter-actualisation (Deleuze 1990: 150). The social certainly has an absolute limit: the plane of immanence or the body without organs. But we can't stay there, for it is here that the fatal breakdown of the schizophrenic occurs; it is here

that we find cases to fill the textbooks on the clinically insane. If Deleuze and Guattari can report that they have never seen such a schizophrenic, we are less certain, perhaps more afraid. On these pages we can only try to construct a body without organs as the relative limit of a specific and concrete social situation. To construct this body, to edit this book, is to make love with worlds.

The body without organs is unquestionably a dangerous 'set of practices', but so are the strata from which desire constantly escapes and to which it returns through processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 149–50). The strata are the habitual and 'striated' orderings of all productive processes as they become actualised in the world. Even if the strata are necessary, even if they cannot be judged good or bad, they systematically suffer from a lack of consistency. They can afford this because there are strong forces to support them: everyday practice, habit, stupidity, capital. The primary stratifications are, as Foucault taught us, knowledge and power, and to this *A Thousand Plateaus* adds the three stratifications of the Organism, Signification and Subjectivation as specifically modern maladies. These establish the dominant strata: Organism and Discipline, Sign and Interpretation, Subject and Subjectivation:[1]

> [1.] You will be organised, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body – otherwise you're just depraved.
> [2.] You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise you are just a deviant.
> [3.] You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement – otherwise you are just a tramp. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 159)

'The social' is only grasped in the dynamic relation between the strata and the plane, and it is to be construed as an actualisation of the 'machinic assemblage', which is situated between the strata and the plane of immanence (cf. ibid.: 506ff.). It is with the concept of the assemblage that Deleuze and Guattari manage to replace and reconfigure the staple sociological and philosophical issue of the relationship between the human and its world (Buchanan 2000: 120).

It also changes the status of the body. The diagrammatic relationship between desiring machines and the body without organs sets the conceptualisation of the body against a remarkably new horizon of sense. The body is of course corporeal, tattooed and scarified by common sense and embedded in the informational and communicative arrangement we call our everyday life. But at the same time the body is incorporeal, that is,

transformed by the incorporeality of sense itself, announcing the order-word (*mot d'ordre*) as a unique kind of 'action' constituted by the incision of the event. 'Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualised elsewhere, at a different moment' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158). This logic of sense coincides with the biopolitical production of affective effects and sets new standards for social analysis. It has to transgress the idea of action as a marriage between causality and human intention and establish *another awareness*, adding to the notion of action which effects the body as an actualised entity in the social organisation. This affords us a notion of action that transforms the body's incorporeal attributes through statements, that is, pure sense-events that change the sensible arrangement and compositional architecture of the body and thereby actualising it in a new affective state organised by a new socio-machinic production, new abstract machines.

This particular connection between production and sense, that is, the corporeal differen*c*iation of the actual and the incorporeal differen*t*iation of the virtual (cf. Deleuze 1994: 209), is the prime organiser of the *socius*. This opens the horizontal axis of the collective assemblages of enunciation and the forms of content to analysis and enables a diagnosis of the vertical diagrammatic axis of the processes of de- and reterritorialisation on the strata.

The strata, too, are children of love.

> [T]here are no revolutionary or reactionary loves . . . [but] . . . there are forms of love that are the indices of the reactive or the revolutionary character of the investment made by the libido of a sociohistorical or geographic field, from which the loved and desired beings receive their definition. (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 365–6; see also Patton 2000: 77)

The various forms of love correspond to the predicament of any machinic assemblage as it finds itself situated between the strata (the plane of organisation: organisms, signs and subjects) and the plane of immanence (where everything is in a state of transformation). Love as a method experiments with bringing any given assemblage out of joint, unbalancing what seems to be balanced, disorganising what appears organised: 'This is the model of the pendulum or balance wheel, the *Unruhe*, that replaces the scale' (Deleuze 1993: 69). Contrary to the scale that subsumes everything under the same categories (metres, dollars), the pendulum is sensitive to the tiniest deviation in height and weight. And even the scale itself and its corresponding principles experience a crisis: 'we shall multiply principles – we can always slip a new one out from under our cuffs – and in this way we

will change their use' (ibid.: 67). To experiment with the social, which is the foolhardy principle of this book, is to configure the social scientist along with the philosopher as a lover, or, as a friend. Terrifying as it is, one must 'reach that twilight hour when one distrusts even the friend' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). In this twilight of combat the relevance of Deleuze's slogans is tested: 'Thought should be thrown like a stone by a war-machine' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 31).

Everything is political. No, we are not too proud to resort to slogans. If social analysis aims at being non-transcendent and hostile to any image of thought, it should effect a diagonal movement between an actualised history and the event of the problem produced by the analysis, an event that is 'immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure *reserve*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 156). It is the concept itself that is able to bring the problem through its critical thresholds towards the problematic, where it will revolt. That is why the intuitive, critical method of creating concepts is so vital to Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.: Chapter 1). The problematic is realised in a milieu as a revolutionary becoming, a conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu, designating the birth of a *political philosophy* (ibid.: 100). Social analysis seen from this point of view is the analysis of the event as a multiplicity, or the analysis of the sayable and the visible and their interrelation as fundamentally *ontological modalities* of signs.

The twentieth century will not likely be called the Deleuzian century. The deadly limbo of the twenty-first century is a more plausible candidate, faced with the withering of civil society, fascism in the streets and in our daily practices, mutant flows of migrations on account of exploitation, and a rampant, world-integrated capitalism deterritorialising the *socius*, the need for an at once critical and affirmative social science should be apparent. This need has hardly been satisfied, and, even more disturbing, the analysis of the social has in recent years lost a great deal of its enunciative force. This is why we at the same time have witnessed a search for new approaches that are able to convey a higher degree of concreteness and precision in the social scientific approach to the emergence, production and organisation of the social. A number of the chapters deal with organisation theory, and the tendency of a sadly diminishing return is especially visible when the concern is research within management and organisation. Here, German phenomenology and especially French post-war philosophy have been dominant in the attempt to revitalise the discourse. It seems nevertheless as if these new approaches remain caught in the resentment typical of the academic showdown: negation rather than affirmation, destruction rather than

creation. Hence, the quest of *thinking anew* is lost at the outset: Oedipus got us again.

Perhaps this is because contemporary social analysis is still concerned with what Foucault characterised as 'disciplinary societies' (Deleuze 1992b). They focus on binary segmentations of the social field (as for instance in dualisms of dominant and dominated) even though the flow of capital and the fluidity of its organisational principles is guided by quite different kinds of segmentations and different kinds of power relations: those of biopolitical production and of the re-production of life itself (Hardt and Negri 2000: 24). It is a power that does not just produce segmentations, organising only the movements of the body, but also functions as a virtual and immanent self-circulation of thoughts and actions within the body under the auspices of humanistic 'freedom'. In this sense, external disciplinary authority has become an internal principle of regulation and control in the social *bios* as such, not so much in its actualised institutions and organisations, but directly in relation to the transformation of their flows of matter and function, where their expressions and contents emerge. It is as Maurizio Lazzarato points out in his discussion of the difference between disciplinary societies and control societies, 'the non-relation as the informal "outside", a virtual, an event' which is confined by the biopolitical sphere Deleuze calls the societies of control.

When the biopolitical power-function works directly on the plane of matter-function it is not enough to construct social analysis solely on epistemological premises, which is to say, as a specific perspective or gaze. Such epistemological premises only focus on the sayable and the visible, and not the ontological modalities of signs that are produced in the actualisation of the social. We are, so to speak, in need of another analytical project, which one could call the constitution of social analytics that seriously engages itself in the fact, there are statements (*énoncés*) which have their own materiality, and it is by this existence of signs, as order-words, that we indeed are able to speak of a societal body. Social analytics is therefore a diagnostics of signs and their materiality. This line of thought is indebted to the somewhat overlooked third part of Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), where Foucault already sketches the problem that was to become central for Deleuze and Guattari, namely, the problematisation of the verb 'to be'.

> The threshold of the statement is the threshold of the existence of signs. Yet even here, things are not so simple, and the meaning of a term like 'existence of signs' requires elucidation. What does one mean when one says that there are signs, and that it is enough for there *to be* signs for there *to be* a statement? What special status should be given to that verb *to be*? (Foucault 1972: 84–5)

It is from the plane of the sign-materiality (which is really the plane of immanence), and not the plane of organisation that a new composition of social analyses must arise, a tactics that engages directly in and on the order-word.

Traditionally the social sciences have concerned themselves with the order of things, to deploy a Foucauldian pun. Deleuze and Guattari, however, turn our attention away from the plane of organisation, where a constant inscription and apparent stabilisation is taking place. Entities are thereby erected by different sedimentary processes: subjects (consider the efforts of Descartes), social contracts (Hobbes) and stabilised 'social facts' (Durkheim).

So this book should serve two purposes. First, it seeks precision in the comprehension of the multiplicity of the social, that is, the *process of the becoming of the social* itself. Second, it explores the consequences of such an approach in regard to specific studies, that is, it seeks to develop the contours of a *new social analytical practice*. This implies, in Deleuze and Guattari, an overflight with infinite speed or what Jameson calls 'stereoscopic thinking' (1990: 28ff.) indicating possible counter-actualisations in which a nomad science, as developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, plays a crucial role. Social analysis must be thought of as pure affirmation that displays the strength of the radicalism implied in a Deleuzian approach to critique while at the same time practising it. In other words, the *raison d'être* of this collection of texts is to explore how the work of Deleuze and Guattari can be put to work, rather than to display what it means. It is not a book in the growing group of introductions and interpretations. They have their own *raison d'être* considering the vast scope and unparalleled complexity of Deleuze's and Guattari's independent works, as well as their collaborations. At the same time, however, they also have their pitfalls: a reduction of complexity instead of a humble respect for the irreducible, a translation of concepts instead of a creation of concepts, a plane of scholastic organisation instead of a line of flight.

The trick is to start in the middle, where things pick up speed. The middle is necessarily constituted by the already familiar distinctions of social science, and to pick up speed is to re-create its concepts from within. The aim is not so much *novelty* as precision and consistency; that is, the aim is greater *creativity* when compared with the practice of social science to which we have grown accustomed. Growing accustomed is ultimately a reductionist and stratifying stance while the analysis provided by Deleuze and Guattari, especially in *A Thousand Plateaus*, performs its critique via affirmation (that is, a re-creation of the collective enunciation). When they take up the work of sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who had been

almost completely forgotten thanks to the efforts of Emile Durkheim, the point is to show that beneath the dominant tradition within social science, preoccupied with order, stability and purity, another stream exists, a real flow of creative conceptualisations of the social, which is accessible through the concepts of belief and desire (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 219ff.). This is also what happens in Deleuze's monographs, which document and affirm the existence of a viable alternative to the hegemonic history of philosophy, a virtual multiplicity of ideas, accessible by an imaginative, intuitive and counter-commonsense reading of the history of thought. Just as philosophy must be counter-actualised to release its real forces, the social sciences are in need of an equivalent re-creation.

The first section of the book is concerned with Order and Organisation. It does not only engage in order in the sense of *mot d'ordre*, that is, the order-words or precepts, the stratifying force embedded in every statement, but also order in its common and almost too familiar sense, as it unfolds its existence on an everyday battlefield, or, rather, as it constitutes a battlefield of social analysis. Either the concept of order is valued for its structural lucidity and its organisational capacity, often appearing as the central concept for general social analyses, or it is perpetually deconstructed using every tool available to the analyst. For that reason alone, Paul Patton's conceptual cartography in regard to the concept of order is vital for everyone conducting social analysis. Order is what protects us from chaos (which in its ultimate sense is death), but more importantly, order as it is found in the Stoic tradition has an immanent *tonos*, a tension that at once moves towards a fixation of thoughts, actions and passions and simultaneously dissolves this fixation, then becoming a structural principle of a different nature. By this token, Patton takes us through the concept of order to the diagrammatic principle of the social, that of the abstract machine, which constitutes and organises the pathologies of our time and which becomes the ontological foundation for the work to be done through its differentiating nature. This ontological foundation belongs as much in the first section as in the book as a whole.

Sure, we always make love with worlds. But as certain: we always fuck it up. Order constantly breaks down; indeed, all abstract machines only work by way of breakdowns (Deleuze and Guattari 1984). These breakdowns are signalled by fear and trembling in the work of Søren Kierkegaard (1983), which Jacques Derrida reads in a thoroughly Deleuzian manner.

I tremble at what exceeds my seeing and my knowing [*mon voir et mon savoir*] although it concerns the innermost parts of me, right down to my

soul, down to the bone, as we say. Inasmuch as it tends to undo both seeing and knowing, trembling is indeed an experience of secrecy or of mystery, but another secret, another enigma, or another mystery comes on top of the unliveable experience, adding yet another seal or concealment to the *tremor*. (Derrida 1995: 54)

This reading could also be the epigraph of Torkild Thanem and Stephen Linstead's chapter on the trembling organisation, a chapter that situates the organisation in a continuous transition between the virtual and the actual. The virtual is what Derrida calls 'another mystery', that comes on top of our (already) unliveable experience. Yet the virtual is as real as the actual, as Marcel Proust notoriously put it; the virtual is 'real without being actual, ideal without being abstract' (Deleuze 1994: 208).

Beginning with one of the cornerstones in Deleuze's work, namely, Henri Bergson, Thanem and Linstead highlight the fact that while organisation is not opposed to change, neither is it synonymous with order. Rather, there exist two types of organisation within the theory of multiplicity: one is immanent to life itself, a vitalistic, virtual organisation that is always embedded in *durée*, and another is a spatial multiplicity of exteriority, actualised in scientific clock time. The second, spatial type of organisation is partly responsible for the erection of the strata. But there is no need for frenzied artistry or orgiastic excesses in order for us to evoke the multiple because desire is a much more skilful engineer than the masters of our present predicament. This lets non-organisation express that which 'exceeds my seeing and my knowing', as Derrida put it, which is the autopoiesis of the virtual: trembling, dangerous and joyful.

Moving from the question of what concepts mean to what they do, we are not only engaged in application, but are moved onward and toward the challenge of transferability, which at once inaugurates its own expression and its own field of intervention in a dramatic staging of sense (as explored in Deleuze 1990). Martin Kornberger, Carl Rhodes and René ten Bos develop this line of investigation, deploying the rhizome as it rises *inside* the dominant image of the modern, hierarchical and organic corporation. Thus they produce the image of the 'Organisation-without-Organs' as actualised by Charles Bukowski's literary alter ego, Chinaski. In the vibrant body of Chinaski, subtracted and expanded by the intermingled actions and passions of the mail carrier, we get the sensation that even in the most rigid segmentarity of the expressive flow of organisation, in the hierarchical sedimentation, there is a forceful flow of proliferating lines, always escaping the apparatuses of capture by virtue of its performative nature. If Patton gives a precise and conceptual configuration of order, Kornberger, Rhodes and ten Bos offer the body of Chinaski as a life

unfolding through the ordered arena of the organisation, always engaged in processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, reaching out towards the Organisation-without-Organs.

Order and Organisation are not separate affairs, but engage in numerous becomings. The same goes for Subjectivity and Transformation, which is the theme of the second part of the book. Everything happens in the middle and only the neighbour matters, the middle is where things pick up speed. There is here no lack of Deleuzian slogans to express an idea that goes to the heart of a historical libidinal materialism; indeed, it was already formulated in Deleuze's book on Hume: 'relations are always external to their terms' (1991: 66). This means that individuals and society, the subject and 'the social', are not only empirically inseparable, but are in fact 'strictly simultaneous and consubstantial' (Massumi 2002: 68ff.). Hence, the experiences of subjectivity in social institutions and organisations must concern the states *in between* subject-positions, that is, must concern change. Peter Lohmann and Chris Steyaert's chapter, 'In the Mean Time', endeavours to do exactly this: to produce what they call an exploratory politics of change. The setting is a large organisation in the electricity industry called ELEC, which is faced with the rampant deterritorialising forces of the market and struggling with deregulation and massive layoffs. And, as it were, a perpetually changing organisation. While traditional theorising on change is occupied with control and command, Lohmann and Steyaert deploy a concept of desire that is pure production and excess. The startling story of an accountant from ELEC, whom the change processes push to his ultimate limits, explores and expresses the conditions of the social as it becomes actualised in bodies: 'The body is never in the present, it contains the before and the after, tiredness and waiting' (Deleuze 1989: 189), and, obviously, despair. An accountant might appear substitutable and perhaps even insignificant to the large bureaucracies of the world, yet the small and trivial, as Nietzsche understood, is often the unexpected locus of force, that is, the locus of the people to come.

This people yet to come keeps asking the nagging question, how do we regain our lost place in life? Instead of tracking this question down through well-worn utopian paths, Thomas Bay takes an empirical approach in his chapter. His case is right under our noses since the one who has, by all social indicators, lost a place in life is the beggar. Could we kiss a beggar, or perhaps make love with him or her? In Bay's chapter, begging is constructed as the non-thought within economic thought, or as the absolute and constitutive outside of economy, an outside without which economy would not be an economy, that is a law, *nomos*, of the house, *oikos*.

This confronts us with a Deleuzian reading of Adam Smith. This is most timely, as neo-liberalism only seems to (superficially) know the Smith of *The Wealth of Nations*, and not the Smith of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Bay knows both and on this firm footing he shows that the contractarian theories of society remain in the negative. Deleuze's reading of Hume reveals society not as a set of limitations but as an ongoing 'institutional invention', which must continuously experiment with transformations of our 'limited sympathy' into 'extended generosity'. This schism is traced to the core of legal society, the *nomos*, which signifies both law as limitation and as expanding distribution: *nōmos* and *nomōs* – 'norms of power . . . norms of life' (Deleuze 1992a: 268). Such an experiment gives a whole new meaning to the notion of 'living economically', not least in present-day western societies that celebrate the spirit of capitalism but seem unable to enjoy it because they are permeated with Max Weber's Protestant, that is, Calvinist, ethos. It is here that the beggar might not 'be abolished', as Nietzsche somewhat disconcertingly suggested, but rather be seen as a virtuality with the force to amend radically our power to be affected. This suggestive reading also confirms the intimate relationship between Deleuze and Derrida (explored in Patton and Protevi 2003); it also calls forth what may be their joint utopia, where one gives without expecting returns of investment, a hospitable economy as the initiator of what the present begs so desperately for, namely, the people to come.

There can be no talk of subjectivity and transformation without a discussion of the notion of technology.[2] What, then, is the conception of technology in this volume, and what are its political implications when a recourse to Enlightenment and humanism is no longer possible? This question is taken up by Chris Land in his chapter on cyborgs and organisation. As seemingly radical post-human theories are shown to be subject to 'cosmic evolutionism' and hence reductionism and ideology (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 49), Land develops the notion of a thorough '*trans*-human becoming', avoiding both post-humanism as well as anti-humanism. As a consequence, the prime signifier (the face) is transformed into a probe-head, and the powerful anthropomorphic stratum is deterritorialised so as to re-materialise signs within a substrate of matter. Deleuze and Guattari are also here working as geophilosophers drawing maps of technology laid out on the plane of consistency (cf. the efforts in Sørensen, forthcoming).

'Language is a virus,' said William Borroughs. But the technical social machines of content that works in tandem with the semiotic collective machines of expression are not only viral they are also, on Land's construal, imperialist. Thus, any absolute deterritorialisation becomes

a matter of *leaving*. It is time to lose face, suggests Land, and it is time, again quoting Burroughs, to get off this stinking, cop-ridden planet.

A volume on Deleuze and the social will have to include essays taking as points of departure Deleuze's manifold works on art, which he couples directly with the outside. The section Art and the Outside ventures directly into film and the cinema, areas where Deleuze's desire for a reinvention of the world, for a virtualisation of what we see, remained immanent. He invested much of his hope in film and TV, hopes which were largely shattered. Ian Buchanan ventures, nevertheless, into this politically permeated, if not utopian, field. While a number of the chapters in the volume deal with Deleuze's question of how it might be possible again to believe in this world, Buchanan's chapter proceeds from a stark assertion. Post-war Europe, whose ruins and wastelands have now spread like toxic moss across the known universe (to use a Jamesonian image), is a stage that has been cleared. Its people are missing and it looks to us now like a bad film.

The worst thing about this emptiness, this *placelessness*, is its complete lack of an outside, a claustrophobic construction masterly engineered in Hitchcock's films. In the 'non-places' of motels, hotels and malls, no actors move across the field, only mutant seers. What they see are shopping centres eating up places to inhabit and labour-time in which to live. Liminal spaces, which, in Buchanan's analysis, are precisely spaces of belief, have all been vaporised. The continuous existential 'undoing' of these spaces can adequately be expressed by a careful and critical reading of the concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. But territory, Buchanan argues, is not primary a placial concept. Rather, it refers to an organisation of desire that may well have a placial dimension, but primarily has to do with our beliefs and allegiances and the ritual and bodily marks that express our social existence. As capitalism frees uncoded flows, 'we' seem to be left with no means to recode and re-ritualise our lives. How can one believe in a world in which the richest 500 are collectively worth more than the poorest 2 billion? Buchanan's own answer is immanent: keep mapping the fields.

The attempt to map the social field has, in recent decades, moved towards expressionism, if you like. This movement seems obvious, once we take into account the fact that aesthetic expressivity has always been about life as it is actualised in affects that move beyond the self-conscious subject. This enables aesthetic expressivity to conjoin but also to confront the biopolitical power of contemporary social production, not only confining the body in circuits of regulation, but also controlling the incorporeal constitution of sense (cf. Deleuze 1990). This is why one cannot say

that art has wholesale become a willing servant to world-integrated capitalism, even though the idealistic and romantic idea of the artist as a critical voice is long gone, or, what would be still more horrifying, has reappeared in the technologies of modern management. Rather, we want to emphasise the more subtle point that when aesthetic expression is actualised as an affective ambience it carries a unique resistance in the midst of the biopolitical field. It is this understanding of resistance and counteractualisation in the centre of order and things that becomes crucial in the constitution of a new social analytical practice, not in the sense that investigation and diagnostics should become artistic expression, but more in the sense that the modalities of art should become a form of biopolitical combat understood as an active ethics of being, far removed from any moral propositions and judgements.

This combat implies a passage to the critical. Deleuze has become increasingly fashionable as one of the few remaining critical voices, too often riding the same bandwagon as Foucault in this regard. Everywhere there is the reduction of the real work of the apparatus to the chatter of discursive formations, a D-formation if you will, a tidy corner in the ongoing academic discourse. Indeed, in his interview with Claire Parnet, Deleuze said that becoming a university professor did not make him especially happy: 'it was simply a normal career'. Like Kafka's famous mouse, however, Deleuze had a talent for 'making a ceremonial performance out of doing the usual thing' (Kafka 1996). There is always a need to sharpen the cutting edges of the machines, to reinvent the critical voice, even if it is as small as Josephine's piping among the greater 'clamour of being'. It was Deleuze's conceptual activism which originally created the fashion for this 'ordinary' song, though his contemporaries perhaps found the military metaphor of the Foucauldian *dispositif* more exciting. As we see it, however, the fashion for military metaphors was always in somewhat poor taste. 'There is a war,' as Leonard Cohen pointed out; it is quite real; and the D-function is a war machine, *no metaphor*.

Understood as a conceptual investigation it certainly appears to be a difficult task to reinvent the D-function, but the difficulties double when one realises that any passive and/or purely scholastic execution of the programme results in transforming Deleuze and Guattari's authorship into a cathedral filled with black holes and white walls (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 167ff.), haunted by empty signifiers. All this would turn Deleuze into history, rather than into an experimental persona. Such pitfalls are avoided in Éric Alliez's chapter. With a combination of conceptual precision and investigative vitalism, Alliez develops the relation between *Anti-Oedipus* and *The Logic of Sense* in a discussion with Alan

Badiou and Slavoj Žižek on the question of being and, hence, on the question of the political. Alliez re-vitalises the critical and experimental force of *Anti-Oedipus*, showing that it is in *Anti-Oedipus* that the ontological monism of Deleuze's biophilosophy becomes a 'biopolitical fact', connecting the univocal plane of the living to desire, to a no less than universal process of production.

The 'current condition', as Marx would have it, of this production is capitalism. The Deleuzian answer is resistance, that is, creativity and affirmation within the multiplicity of social dramas. The section on Capitalism and Resistance aims at radically broadening the scopes of our current dramas. However, as Maurizio Lazzarato shows in his chapter, disciplinarity works by exactly conditioning and confining *the outside*. Yet, even as capitalism has found new technologies of capture and of imposing the consumer's free will and deep humanism, the event itself breaks free and forms new monads. The difference between disciplinary societies and control societies is the role the informal 'outside' plays as a virtuality. The production of subjectivity is no longer bound to the disciplinary power that only knows the body and the individual (as in Taylorism and the earlier western welfare regimes), but subjectivity is now submersed and moulded by the biopolitical power that is aimed at 'whatever' multiplicity that passes through the societal body, that is, a global mass specific to life as such. This changes the aim of any social analysis away from binary segmentarity towards the concept of 'modulation' in respect to the open and smooth space of control societies; or in short, the modulation of life and the living itself. With Tarde's notion of the public sphere as a gigantic, instantaneous brain, the 'thought brain' from *What is Philosophy?* has received the analytical counterpart necessary for 'whatever' resistance.

Few notions in the work of Deleuze and Guattari have received more attention than that of the nomad. Nomadism has been applied widely and sometimes wildly. While tempered and consciously avoiding this temptation, Holland's chapter brings the concept of the nomad into contact with citizenship. Taking up the distinction between royal science and nomad science, Holland explicates its social consequences, as the two modes of knowledge have different relations to *work*: royal science deterritorialises labour, and makes the intellectual dependent upon the state's power, while nomad science preserves knowledge within the practice of its production (the body without organs is, as might be recalled, not a concept but a set of practices, cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 149–50). Likewise, according to Holland, with jazz and classical music: the manner in which these two musical forms contribute to the organisation of the social field as such is suggestive to the nature of social organisation in general.

A prime social theorist, who is undergoing a revival in social theory, Mary Parker Follett is singled out as what could be called a nomad management theorist, operating with the group rather than the individual, enabling the emergence of horizontal rather than vertical relations of authority. Here arises a concept of 'power-with', which allows us to understanding nomadic, participatory democracy in action. There also arises a welcome occasion to pit Follett (and Deleuze) directly against Carl Schmitt's construction of sovereignty in terms of the enemy – friend distinction. A no less than musical, nomadic form of citizenship, based on group-alliances, is, both on a local and a global level, a faithfully Deleuzian answer to this *impasse*.

Jussi Vähämäki and Akseli Virtanen pose the problem of resistance in terms of multiplicity, overruling the long tradition of establishing binary dualisms of inclusion/exclusion in the social sciences, whether as a strategy that implies the notion of disciplinary societies (Foucault), or the foundation of functional differentiated systems (Niklas Luhmann), or aimed directly at a specific 'object' of social analyses such as the oppressed and/or marginalised social groups imposed by the politics of equality and equal rights. In whatever form this binary segmentation is put to work, it presupposes a conceptualisation of change and history as underpinned by a linear time frame. Such image of history and change is contested by Vähämäki and Virtanen's chapter, where change is developed as creativity without reason and cause, directly related to the effective and affective force of the multitude. In this sense, the concept of multiplicity it brought to bear on capitalism and the problem of change, that is, revolution. Not so much in the sense that it erects a justified or moral rightful political voice, but more in the sense that it points to our understanding of the specific changeable (revolutionary) force we with Marx may call 'living labour': a power that exceeds its historical predicament, but nevertheless conditions our present time, that is, the temporality of a 'we', a people to come.

Revolutions have their contexts, often overlooked in the heat of the moment. Likewise, in analyses of the social from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, their 'theory' or perhaps, 'theories' are often either not connected to other social theories at all or are merely linked to the ones that Deleuze and Guattari themselves draw on, for example, Marx, Nietzsche, Blanchot and Tarde. Niels Albertsen and Bülent Diken set out to ameliorate this situation in their chapter named 'Society with/out Organs' in the final section of this volume, Social Constitution and Ontology.

As flux and fluids seem to be what high capitalism thrive on, it is also the base of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of the social (as well, of course,

as the mental). Between chaos and consistency, this flux, comprising of different flows, cut off and conjoined by different machines, stabilises into assemblages of matter and form, content and expression. These categories enable Albertsen and Diken to follow the geophilosophical slogan and draw what we consider to be the first of its kind: *a map of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology*. It consists of two axes, one as a continuum between order and chaos, and one as a continuum between purity and heterogeneity. This enterprise gives ample opportunity for comparing a Deleuzian ontology with the one developed by Niklas Luhmann (and to a lesser extent those developed by Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour). It also, if only indirectly, points to the shortcomings of a purely functionalist (e.g., a purely Luhmannian) approach to the problems in the social sciences as they are faced with global streams of capital, rapid changes and mass migration: how should a sober nomadology be deployed when everybody is becoming nomad?

Much contemporary social analysis is exclusively occupied with epistemological premises and presuppositions, thus either neglecting any elaboration of the ontological qualities of Being or unconsciously importing an empty ontology and therefore reducing the univocality of Being to the everyday quarrels of social science in general. In both cases we end up with pure abstractions that mask the fact that any distinction presupposes a totalitarian image of identity from where the differential nature of Being becomes deducted. In the final chapter, written by Manuel DeLanda, we are directly faced with this problem in terms of how we are to analyse the differential properties of scale at work inside the societal body, that is, how are we to avoid the reductionism embedded in the distinctions of scale when we trace and analyse the moveable lines of society? DeLanda goes a long way towards showing that the answer is to deploy the notion of the assemblage for each of the singular, individual entities that comprises each 'level' of the scale, in effect warding off any essentialist presuppositions. DeLanda thus inaugurates a transmission of social ontology into concrete social analysis. He does this by incorporating two strong insights: one is the already noted Humean slogan of the 'exteriority of relations', which leads to a new vibrant empiricism; the other is the assemblage-theory, in which the assemblage constitutes the decisive materiality of the social bios, yet is run through by abstract machines of various kinds.

This transmission must, finally, be placed in the foreground in the creation of a new social analytics, emphasising the ontological constitution of the virtual-real, which becomes the prime diagrammatic component in what could be considered 'empirical'. This liberates the analysis from the fixated anthropological gaze that Foucault warned against, and redirects

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