

LOUBNA EL AMINE



Classical Confucian  
Political Thought

A NEW INTERPRETATION

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*Loubna El Amine*

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*For my parents*

*Adnan El Amine and Fadia Hoteit*





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## *Acknowledgments*



There is an old Arabic saying, sometimes attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, that goes, “Seek knowledge, even in China.” The idea of China as a faraway—the furthest away—land had not completely disappeared from the social imagination in the Arab world by the time I was an undergraduate. That I ended up writing a book on China’s central intellectual tradition was the result of an unexpected journey that started with my professor and mentor at the American University of Beirut, Yahya Sadowski. He encouraged his students to think about the Arab world comparatively, often using East Asia as an example. When I started graduate studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, it was Robert Eno’s class on Classical Chinese philosophy that introduced me to Confucianism, with which I have stayed since.

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I sometimes wonder, given the centrality of family to Confucian thought, whether I would have been drawn to it in the same way I was, ten years ago, had I not grown up in a happy family. My brothers Mehdi and Ramzy both react to the world with a healthy dose of humor and *bon sens*, gently tugging at me when I get too tied up in the throes of academia. My parents are both academics; we were raised amongst books, and dinner conversations at home always involved intellectual, political, and ethical issues. But seriousness was also balanced with light-heartedness, and combined with a freedom for each of us to choose our own way in the world. This book is dedicated to my parents who made it all possible.

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## Note on Translations and Transliterations



Unless otherwise indicated, I have quoted from Confucius, *The Analects*, trans. D. C. Lau (London: Penguin, 1979) for all translations from the *Analects*. I have also consulted Confucius, *Confucius: Analects with Selections from Traditional Commentaries*, trans. Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). Chapter and section numbers follow Lau. For the *Mencius*, I have quoted, unless otherwise indicated, from Mencius, *Mencius*, trans. D. C. Lau (rev. ed.; London: Penguin, 2003), and consulted Mencius, *Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*, trans. Bryan Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008). Chapter and section numbers follow Lau. For the *Xunzi*, I have quoted, unless otherwise indicated, from Xunzi, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, 3 vols., trans. John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988–94), and consulted Xunzi, *Xunzi: Basic Writings*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Chapter and section numbers follow Knoblock.

I have adopted the Hanyu Pinyin system for the romanization of Chinese characters throughout except for proper names that are predominantly romanized according to the Wade-Giles system in English-language texts.



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**Classical Confucian  
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## Prologue



Confucianism has become popular again in recent years. With the failure of communism as a state ideology, the Chinese government has been turning more and more to long-vilified Confucius for inspiration. The motto of a “harmonious society” (*hexie shehui* 和谐社会), strewn on banners throughout Beijing in preparation for the 2008 Olympics, was meant to signal the Confucian renaissance of the country. More recently, China’s president, Xi Jinping, has been known to reference Confucius and other Chinese Classical thinkers in his speeches. The government also projects its reinvented identity worldwide, exporting cultural centers, known as Confucius Institutes, to countries around the world. This revival of Confucianism is not, however, limited to the political level; it also pervades contemporary social life in China.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Confucianism has also witnessed a resurgence in Western and Chinese academia, fueled by post-Cold War debates about the compatibility between non-Western traditions and liberal democracy, and more specifically by the debate that became known as the “East Asian Challenge to Human Rights.”<sup>2</sup> It has also benefited from increasing interest in political theory and in philosophy in non-Western traditions, which has led to the emergence of subfields like comparative philosophy and comparative political theory.

<sup>1</sup> See Daniel Bell, *China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); William Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds., *Confucianism and Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong, eds., *Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Inspired by these two trends, this book investigates Classical Confucian political thought: its conception of government, of the relationship between ruler and ruled, of the methods of ruling, and of the obligations of individuals toward the political community. In other words, the book does for Classical Confucian thinkers what political theorists have long done for thinkers from the Western tradition, from Plato to Nietzsche.

### Ethics and Politics in Classical Confucianism

Confucianism might not at first appear as the most likely candidate for a project that is motivated by an interest in non-Western conceptions of politics, for its wisdom has usually been understood to be of a moral or spiritual rather than political nature. This is not especially surprising insofar as the Classical Confucian texts, the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, and the *Xunzi*, include many sayings that express the Confucian masters' judgment about a person's conduct in society. To illustrate, the first entry in the *Analects* goes as follows: "The Master said: 'Is it not a pleasure, having learned something, to try it out at due intervals? Is it not a joy to have friends come from afar? Is it not gentlemanly not to take offence when others fail to appreciate your abilities?'"<sup>3</sup> Social relationships are indeed central to the early Confucian texts. The latter are full of guidelines about how to treat parents, siblings, neighbors, friends, and superiors. Anecdotes about the proper relationship between parents and sons especially abound. Mencius, for example, relates the story of Shun who persisted in his obedience to his parents despite their cruelty toward him. As the story goes, Shun's parents once asked him to fix the roof of the storehouse and then set fire to it while he was repairing it. On another occasion, they forced him down the well and then covered the well with him inside. Nevertheless, Shun remained unwavering in his respect for them, an accomplishment that, recognized by the extant emperor, was to earn him the position of next emperor.<sup>4</sup>

The preponderance of anecdotes about social relationships should not, however, mask the fact that the anecdotes relating to government are also plentiful, easily constituting half of the content of the texts. The *Mencius* begins with a presumed encounter between Mencius

<sup>3</sup> *Analects* 1.1.

<sup>4</sup> *Mencius* 5A.2.

himself and King Hui of Liang in which Mencius encourages the king to give up concern for profit in favor of *ren* 仁 and rightness (*yi* 義).<sup>5</sup> The *Xunzi* includes chapters on the regulations of kings, on enriching and strengthening the state, on the duties of ministers, and on military affairs, among others. In fact, it is precisely the intriguing question of the relationship between its ethical and political components that makes Confucianism an interesting case to study. To return to the story of Shun, we can glean already from the anecdote reported above the intertwining of ethics and politics, for it reveals the importance not only of filial piety per se, but also of filiality in a good ruler, which Shun was to become.

As Benjamin Schwartz has argued, one should think of the Confucian texts as working along two dimensions: an ethical dimension concerned with “self-development” (*xiu shen* 修身, *xiu ji* 修己) and a political dimension concerned with the “ordering of society” (*zhi guo* 治國) and the “pacification of the world” (*ping tianxia* 平天下).

The relationship between the two is fraught with a certain tension, indicated by Schwartz’s use of the concept of “polarity” to characterize it.<sup>6</sup> Schwartz has also argued that the concept of the *Dao* (道)—the Way—in the *Analects*, refers, in its most expansive meaning, to the whole sociopolitical order. This usage includes the different social and political roles to be performed—starting in the family—and the rituals governing the performance of these roles. On the other hand, the *Dao* also “emphatically” refers to the “inner” moral life of the individual. Schwartz contends that “a central problematique of the *Analects* involves the relation between the two.”<sup>7</sup>

In much of the recent literature on Confucianism, the relationship between ethics and politics in early Confucianism has been presented

<sup>5</sup> *Mencius* 1A.1. A wide controversy surrounds the translation of *ren* into English. Stephen Angle translates it as “humaneness,” Hsiao Kung-chuan as well as D. C. Lau as “benevolence,” Edward Slingerland as “goodness,” Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont as “authoritative conduct,” while others, like Benjamin Schwartz, prefer to leave it untranslated. I follow Schwartz in leaving it untranslated. I will return to the meaning of *ren* in Chapter 4. *Yi* (rightness) differs from *ren* in that *ren* indicates an internal disposition to relate to others in a reciprocal way, while *yi* denotes the application of external principles of proper behavior to given circumstances.

<sup>6</sup> See Benjamin Schwartz, “Some Polarities in Confucian Thought,” in *Confucianism in Action*, ed. David Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 52. The other two polarities that Schwartz identifies in Confucianism are “knowledge versus action” and the “inner versus outer realms.”

<sup>7</sup> Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 62.

as a one-sided relationship where politics is wholly dependent on ethics, thus failing to capture the tension between the two. Indeed, prominent writers on Chinese political thought, including Joseph Needham,<sup>8</sup> Hsiao Kung-chuan,<sup>9</sup> Fung Yu-lan,<sup>10</sup> D. C. Lau, and Herbert Fingarette, have assumed that Confucian politics is the logical conclusion of Confucian ethics and that the second is therefore more important than the first. Thus Lau writes that “Mencius’ political philosophy . . . is not only consistent with his moral philosophy but is derived from it. Ancient Chinese thinkers all looked upon politics as a branch of morals.”<sup>11</sup> Sor-hoon Tan contends that “the early Confucians themselves subordinated politics to ethics.”<sup>12</sup> Heiner Roetz has argued that Confucian politics is “subordinated to a moral goal,” which is “the cultivation of man . . . his moral elevation.”<sup>13</sup> Similarly, in an introductory book on Chinese philosophy, JeeLoo Liu writes that “Confucians believe that morality is an indispensable element in politics: the ideal ruler should be a sage king; the ideal function of government is to morally transform its people.”<sup>14</sup> Paul Goldin also contends that “the only legitimate purpose of [Confucian] government” is to bring about “moral transformation in the populace.”<sup>15</sup> Kwong-loi Shun argues that Confucius and Mencius “regarded the transformative power of a cultivated person as the ideal basis for government.”<sup>16</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Needham argues that “in early Confucianism there was no distinction between ethics and politics.” See Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 9.

<sup>9</sup> Hsiao compares Confucius to Plato, arguing that they both value ethics over politics. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, trans. Frederick Mote (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 113.

<sup>10</sup> When discussing Confucius’s thought, Fung does not discuss any of his political ideas. See Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 43–75.

<sup>11</sup> D. C. Lau, introduction to *Mencius*, xxxviii.

<sup>12</sup> Sor-hoon Tan, “Democracy in Confucianism,” *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 5 (2012): 295.

<sup>13</sup> Heiner Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction under the Aspect of the Breakthrough toward Postconventional Thinking* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 77.

<sup>14</sup> JeeLoo Liu, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 187.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Goldin, *Confucianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 20.

<sup>16</sup> Kwong-loi Shun, “Mencius,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/mencius/>. May Sim writes that for Confucius, like for Aristotle, “the aim of government is to make people virtuous.” See Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 167. Similarly, Shaohua Hu writes that “Confucian doctrine is less political theory than it is ethical teaching.” See Hu, “Con-

Some commentators identify core Confucian virtues and then argue that the preferred Confucian political arrangement is the one that allows for the development of these for all members of society. For example, in Herbert Fingarette's short book, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (1972), which set the tone for much of the contemporary philosophical reappraisal of Confucianism, the emphasis is on ceremonial ritual and its centrality to moral flourishing. Fingarette interprets Confucius's political vision as being aimed at propagating the same value of ceremonial ritual through an emphasis on cultural unity for the competing regional states of the day, on the grounds that culture is necessary for the development of ceremony.<sup>17</sup>

William Theodore de Bary has argued that the dependence of Confucian politics on ethics, specifically with relation to the idea of a "sage king," is "the trouble with Confucianism," "there from the start, to become both a perennial challenge and a dilemma that would torment it through history."<sup>18</sup> In a similar line of thought, Stephen Angle describes the "interdependence" between morality and politics as a "central tenet" of Confucianism, and as the main challenge in adapting Confucianism to a modern, democratic politics, given the weight it gives to the presence of a virtuous ruler on top of the political system, to the detriment of institutional constraints on the ruler's actions.<sup>19</sup>

Recent attempts to rethink Confucianism have thus centered on recasting core Confucian ethical values into a more democratic political vision than the one offered in the early texts. Angle's solution to the sage king problem rests on rethinking the implications of key Confucian ideas, such as the idea that each and every person can become virtuous, and the idea that virtue requires political involvement, to imagine a more inclusive form of politics.<sup>20</sup> David Hall and Roger

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fucianism and Western Democracy," in *China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000), 66. Yang Guorong argues that Mencius's political thought has a tendency toward "a pan-moralist vision of political life." See Yang, "Mengzi and Democracy: Dual Implications," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 31, no. 1 (2004): 100.

<sup>17</sup> Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1972), 64.

<sup>18</sup> William Theodore de Bary, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen C. Angle, *Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 180, 193.

<sup>20</sup> Angle, *Sagehood*, 212–13. He develops this line of thought more fully in *Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). Similarly, Ranjoo Seodu Herr argues that Confucianism is compatible with democ-

Ames suggest, on the basis of “the unsuitability of the central tradition of rights-based liberalism for the Chinese situation,” that essential Confucian tenets, like the emphasis on rites, “might well be translated into a communitarian form of democratic society.”<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Sor-hoon Tan takes her lead from core Confucian ideas like *ren* (仁) and rituals to offer a distinctive form of “Confucian Democracy” that combines Confucianism and the pragmatism of John Dewey and that builds on the idea that “ethical ends are political ends, and vice-versa, in early Confucianism.”<sup>22</sup> Finally, Daniel Bell, while explicitly rejecting what he calls the “depoliticization” of the *Analects* (a reference to the approach of contemporary best-selling Chinese author Yu Dan, who focuses on the spiritual dimension of the text), also discusses the moral values advanced by the early Confucians more than he discusses their own political vision. Bell advocates the work of contemporary Chinese theorist Jiang Qing, who is interested in what he describes as “Political Confucianism,”<sup>23</sup> and whose proposals, such as a tricameral legislature (representing popular, sacred, and cultural legitimacy), owe more, as Bell says, to Jiang’s “political imagination than to ancient texts.”<sup>24</sup> Bell argues, however, that such imagination is precisely what is necessary in a forward-looking interpretation of core Confucian ideas, like hierarchy, ritual propriety, and merit that would yield a distinctively Confucian form of democracy. Jiang Qing is indeed one of many recent Chinese intellectuals, often referred to as the “New Confucians,” grappling

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racy by focusing on the Confucian notion of equality. Democracy follows, according to Herr, from the Confucian recognition of the equal potential of all for moral perfection. See Herr, “Confucian Democracy and Equality,” *Asian Philosophy* 20, no. 3 (2010): 280. See also Chenyang Li, “Confucian Value and Democratic Value,” *Journal of Value Inquiry* 31, no. 2 (1997), where Li, rejecting the argument that Mencius’s conception of government is democratic, inquires about core Confucian values and their compatibility with core democratic values.

<sup>21</sup> David Hall and Roger Ames, *Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 13.

<sup>22</sup> Sor-hoon Tan, *Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 131.

<sup>23</sup> Jiang Qing favors the development of the Gongyang tradition, associated with the Han dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE), who advocated Confucianism as an ideology for the Han imperial state, and later revived by Kang Youwei (1858–1927), in opposition to the Xinxing tradition, concerned with “self-cultivation.” See Bell, *China’s New Confucianism*, 176.

<sup>24</sup> Bell, *China’s New Confucianism*, 180. For Jiang’s proposals, see Jiang Qing, *A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

with the question of the relationship between ethics and politics in their attempt to offer a vision of Confucianism for the modern world. As David Elstein puts it, “Almost all modern Ruist [Confucian] thinkers see a tension between the ethical and political sides of Ruism and make a choice about which is more important.”<sup>25</sup>

The tendency to favor a set of core Confucian moral values can arguably be understood as a reaction to the critique of Confucianism by modernization enthusiasts, both Chinese and Western. Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various Chinese reformers called for the repudiation of Confucianism and the establishment of constitutionalism, democratic freedoms, and individual rights. In the middle of the century, the Chinese communists attacked Confucianism for its patriarchal conception of the family, its hierarchical leanings, its relegation of the least educated to the lowest rung of society, and its promotion of hypocrisy on the part of the ruler toward the masses.<sup>26</sup> To counter these charges, it was felt necessary to elicit the best in Confucianism, and build upon it a modern politics. This was the strategy pursued in the interlude between the May Fourth Movement and the Cultural Revolution, when disillusionment with Western ideals encouraged the reevaluation of Confucianism through a turn toward “the interpretation of Confucius’ ethical concepts.”<sup>27</sup> It is this same approach that has been pursued since the 1970s. As the eminent Chinese American historian Yu Ying-shih puts it, “In the West today we are more inclined to see Confucianism as a way of life involving faith and spiritual values,” in contradistinction to “a crude but once dominant notion that Confucianism was no more than a political ideology that functioned to legitimate imperial authority.”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> David Elstein, *Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 23. Elstein discusses this tension in the thought of Xu Fuguan (69–74), Mou Zongsan (49–52), Lee Ming-huei (98–100), and Jiang Qing (146.) On Mou Zongsan, see also Angle, *Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy*, 24–35.

<sup>26</sup> Kam Louie, *Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980), 7, 105.

<sup>27</sup> Louie, *Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China*, 177.

<sup>28</sup> From the introduction to Hoyt Tillman, *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), ix. Yu also argues that “if we trust Confucius’ *Analects*, then the sage’s original vision was focused decidedly more on personal cultivation and family life than on the governing of the state. Or, we may say, Confucius was primarily concerned with moral order and only secondarily with political order.” From de Bary et al., roundtable discussion on the *Trouble with Confucianism*, *China Review International* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 27–28, quoted in Angle, *Sagehood*, 190.

Thomas Metzger also describes Chinese intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s as “sifting through the impure ore of their past to extract a ‘spirit’ of morality which could serve for the future.”<sup>29</sup>

Another reason why Confucian politics is relegated to a secondary status in comparison to Confucian ethics can be traced to the great Confucian commentator, Zhu Xi (1130–1200). At the risk of overgeneralization, it might be contended that, until the twentieth century when efforts to look at Confucianism afresh multiplied, most Chinese interpreters after Zhu Xi read Confucianism through the lens of moral self-cultivation. Zhu Xi is considered the most influential proponent of what is now known as Neo-Confucianism, characterized by a concern with the development of the inner self. Zhu Xi was in fact so influential that his selection and commentary on four Classical texts (the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Doctrine of the Mean*),<sup>30</sup> known as the “Four Books,” became the canon for learning and formed the foundation of the curriculum for the Chinese imperial civil examination system used from the fourteenth century until 1905. In recent attempts to present Confucianism to the modern world, Zhu Xi’s influence is still felt. For example, William Theodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming have contributed much to Confucian scholarship by unearthing a “liberal” strand in Confucianism based on its concern with the individual’s inner life. Thus, in *The Liberal Tradition in China* (1983), de Bary illuminates what he considers Confucius’s reformist creed and the “vitality,” “creativity,” “critical temper,” strong individualism, voluntarism, and concern with self-development characteristic of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song period (960–1279 CE).<sup>31</sup> Similarly, in *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation* (1985), Tu showcases Confucian authors and ideas that exhibit a concern with self-realization.<sup>32</sup>

Zhu Xi’s ascendancy has overshadowed alternative interpretations of Confucianism. For example, consider the interpretation offered by

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 7.

<sup>30</sup> The *Xunzi* was excluded because of Xunzi’s argument that human nature is bad. According to Paul Goldin, Xunzi’s decline in favor started in the Eastern Han, but quickened during the Tang and Song, reaching its climax with Zhu Xi, “who declared that Xunzi’s philosophy resembled that of non-Confucians [statecraft/Legalist thinkers] such as Shen Buhai . . . and Shang Yang . . . and that he was indirectly responsible for the notorious disasters of the Qin dynasty.” See Goldin, *Confucianism*, 67–68.

<sup>31</sup> William Theodore de Bary, *The Liberal Tradition in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 8–9.

<sup>32</sup> Tu Wei-ming, *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).

Chen Liang (1143–94), a contemporary of Zhu Xi. Chen and Zhu lived in a dwindling Chinese empire, at the time threatened by the Jurchens from the north. In the face of the crisis, Chen favored the turn within Confucianism toward a utilitarian ethics focused on social and political effects over Zhu Xi’s “morality of personal virtue.”<sup>33</sup> This involved Chen in emancipating Confucian concepts “from the confines of current [Song Dynasty] usage,” for example, in recasting in positive light the category of rulers known as hegemons (*ba*),<sup>34</sup> and in glossing the idea of the golden age of antiquity when sage kings ruled as a useful myth rather than an actual historical reality.<sup>35</sup> Chen Liang remained a much less well-known figure in Chinese history than Zhu Xi but is tellingly associated with the Confucian school known as “statecraft,” or more literally, “ordering the world” (*jing shi* 經世). This school of thought was concerned with administrative matters (flood control, the provision of grain, etc.) and political matters (the prerogatives of the ruler, power politics, etc.), and rebuked the emphasis on abstract ethical and metaphysical issues characteristic of mainstream Confucianism.<sup>36</sup>

### The Thesis of This Book

My argument in this book is that the approach to politics offered in the Classical Confucian texts does not follow from Confucian ethics in any straightforward manner. This argument can be said to be orthogonal to the debate on the contemporary application of Confucianism: by showing that the Confucian political vision is not necessarily one of a sage king seeking the moral edification of his people, I raise some doubts about the accusation of the conflation of ethics and politics in Classical Confucianism and therefore about this being “the trouble with Confucianism.” However, how Confucianism can be tailored to the modern world is not otherwise the concern of this book. Rather, my aim is to

<sup>33</sup> Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 133.

<sup>34</sup> More on hegemons in Chapter 1.

<sup>35</sup> Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 135–36.

<sup>36</sup> See William Theodore de Bary, ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 155–215. William T. Rowe explores the tension between moralism and practical management in the thought of the Chinese official Chen Hongmou (1696–1771) in *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). I thank Leigh Jenco for this reference and for directing me to the statecraft writings.

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